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UTAH SUPREME COURT 
PAT BARTHOLOMEW 
CLERK OF THE COURT 
Re: State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Lora Green 
Appeal No. 20010316-$^ -
Our File No.: 96-522P 
Dear Ms. Bartholomew: 
As I indicated to you in our recent telephone conversation, we have found some 
typographical errors in our brief and would like to correct those prior to oral argument. 
Specifically, the errors occurred in our Table of Authorities wherein certain page numbers 
were incorrect and typographical errors appeared in three of the citations contained in our 
Table of authorities. Enclosed please find two copies of pages: iv, v, vi, 18 and 19 of our 
brief which correct the typographical errors. Would you be kind enough to allow us to 
substitute these five pages which correct the typographical errors in our brief. By a copy 
of this letter, I am sending the five corrected pages to opposing counsel, L. Rich 
Humpherys. If you will call me, we can set an appointment to have the printer substitute 
these pages. 
Thank you for your cooperation. 
Very truly yours 
SMlfH &£LAJ0SER, P.C. 
CHARD K. GLAUSER 
RKG:rk 
cc: L. Rich Humpherys 
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The majority of courts that have considered this exact issue have found that where an 
insured fails to obtain written consent from the insurer before settling claims against a 
tortfeasor, thereby destroying the insurer's subrogation rights, the insured is not entitled to 
collect UIM benefits. This is especially true where the insured settles with the underinsured 
motorist.10 The Supreme Court in Hawaii did an extensive analysis throughout the country 
on consent to settle provisions and found the "validity of consent to settle provision has been 
widely litigated throughout the country . . . and a majority of jurisdictions have upheld such 
provisions in a UIM context." Tavlorv. GEICO. 978 P.2d 740, 746 (Haw. 1999) (citations 
omitted). Stating the majority rule, the court in Klang v. American Family Ins. Group, 398 
N.W. 2d 49 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986), held that: 
An insured who settles with and releases an underinsured tortfeasor before 
giving her insurer notice . . . is precluded from bringing an action against her 
insurer for underinsured benefits. 
Id. at 49.n 
10
 See, e.g.. Brantley v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 586 So.2d 184 (Ala. 
1991); Gates v. Claret 945 F.2d 102 (5th Cir. 1991); Argiro v. Progressive American Ins. 
Co.. 510 So.2d 635 (Fla. Ct. App. 1987); General Acci. Ins. Co. v. Taplis. 493 So.2d 32 
(FlaCt. App. 1986). 
11
 See also. Fraioli v. Metropolitan. 748 A.2d 273 (R.I. 2000) (plaintiff is required 
to protect subrogation rights and obtain the consent of his or her UIM carrier before 
settling with tortfeasor or coverage will be denied); Hernandez v. Gulf Group, 875 
S.W.2d 691 (Texas 1994) (failure to obtain permission from the UIM carrier creates a 
breach of contract cause of action but prejudice must be shown); Erie v. Shapiro, 450 
S.E.2d 144 (Va. 1994) (a consent to settle provision was valid and claimant who settled 
without consent was not entitled to UIM coverage); Fireman's Fund Ins. v. Bragg, 548 
A.2d 151 (Md. Ct. App. 1988) (a consent to settle clause is valid); Kronjaeger v. West 
Virginia Corp.. 490 S.E.2d 657 (W. Va. 1997) (a consent to settle provision in a UIM 
18 
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Beavers, 611 So.2d 348 (Ala. 1992), is factually similar to the 
present case. In Allstate, the plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle accident involving his 
father. The plaintiff had an automobile liability policy that provided UIM benefits. 
However, coverage was subject to an exclusion if a settlement occurred with the tortfeasor 
without the insurer's written permission. Additionally, Allstate notified plaintiffs attorney 
of its subrogation rights under the policy and requested notification before the plaintiff 
signed any.release. The plaintiff released the father and did not notify Allstate until after the 
fact. Allstate then requested evidence of the tortfeasor's policy limits; that the policy limits 
had been tendered; and also requested a list of medical expenses plaintiff incurred. Allstate 
wrote plaintiffs attorney that it had become aware that a release had been executed and 
asked for a copy of the release to determine how to proceed. 
Allstate filed a declaratory relief action requesting a declaration that UIM benefits 
were not available to plaintiff due to lack of consent before settling with the tortfeasor. The 
trial court denied Allstate's motion for summary judgment, the Alabama Supreme Court 
overturned the trial court holding that the consent to settle clause was valid and that settling 
without permission destroyed Allstate's subrogation rights. The court noted: 
policy that required an insured to first obtain permission from the UIM carrier before 
settling with the tortfeasor is valid but there must be prejudice); U.S. Fidelity and Guar. 
Co. v. Hillmam 367 So.2d 914 (Miss. 1979) (consent to settle valid and faHure to seek 
consent prior to settlement voids coverage); Murriel v. Alfa Insurance. 697 So.2d 370 
(Miss. 1997) (consent to settle provisions are valid and essential to protecting the 
insurer's subrogation rights but may be waived if later permission is requested and is 
unreasonably withheld). 
19 
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CLERK OF THE COURT 
Re: 
Dear Clerk: 
State Farm v. Lora Green 
Case No. 960400447 
Appeal No. 20010316-SC 
In reviewing the Plaintiff/Appellee Brief that was filed upon behalf of State Farm 
Mutual Automobile Insurance Company in the above-referenced case, it was discovered 
that there is a incorrect reference on page 11 of the Appellee Brief. The page references 
are 1549 through 1542, which is incorrect. The correct page reference to the Record 
should be R. 1544-1545. 
Specific references to pages 1928,1945 and 2234 should be ignored as they are 
blank page dividers. 
Pursuant to my discussion with the Court, I am dictating this letter so that it may be 
placed with the brief. I am also sending this letter by fax to opposing counsel this day. 
If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me. 
Sincerely, 
SMITH & GLAUSER, P.C. 
ALBERT W. GRAY 
AWG:kld 
cc: L. Rich Humpherys (Via Fax: 355-3472) 
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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
78-2-2(3)0X1998). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Green's appeal of the trial court's Order denying her Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment and later granting State Farm's Motion for Summary Judgment presents the 
following issues: 
1. Did the trial court correctly find that the "Consent to Settle" provision in an 
underinsured motorist policy that requires an insured to obtain the written consent of an 
insurer before entering into a settlement and release with the underinsured motorist is valid 
and enforceable under Utah law? (See policy provisions, Addendum A.) This issue presents 
a combination of questions of law and of statutory interpretation and is reviewed under the 
correctness standard. See, Rushton v. Salt Lake County, 977 P.2d 1201,1203 (Utah 1999). 
2. Did the trial court correctly find that Green was not entitled to underinsured 
motorist benefits where she failed to notify or obtain written consent from State Farm before 
entering into a settlement and release of an underinsured motorist where such settlement and 
release prejudiced State Farm's subrogation rights. This issue is reviewed under the 
correctness standard. See, Mast v. Overson. 971 P.2d 928, 931 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). 
3. Did the trial court correctly find that Green could not "stack" the underinsured 
motorist benefits from her three State Farm policies under Utah law. This issue also presents 
questions of statutory interpretation and is reviewed under the correctness standard. See. 
Rushton v. Salt Lake County. 977 P.2d 1201,1203 (Utah 1999). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
1. Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
2. Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-305 (effective July 1995) 
3. Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-22-305(12) (effective April 20, 1995) 
4. Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-l-102(7) (effective 1985) 
5. Utah Insurance Department Rules R 590-211 -4 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This lawsuit for declaratory relief was filed on July 1, 1996, by Plaintiff State Farm 
Mutual Automobile Insurance Company ("State Farm"). (R. 1-40.) The declaratory relief 
sought by State Farm requested a court ruling that Lora Green ("Green") was not entitled to 
underinsured motorist ("UIM") benefits because Plaintiff had breached the Consent to Settle 
provision of her policy by entering into a settlement and completely releasing her mother, 
Marlene Murray ("Murray"), without obtaining State Farm's prior written consent to do so. 
In its action, State Farm claimed that by failing to notify State Farm of the intended 
settlement or obtain its consent before releasing Murray, Green denied State Farm the 
opportunity to subrogate against the tortfeasor Murray. (R. 1-40.) 
Discovery proceeded in the case until April 1999, when Green filed a motion for 
partial summary judgment alleging that the Consent to Settle provision was unenforceable 
2 
as it was inconsistent with Utah's underinsured motorist statutes. (R. 385-386; 674-697.) 
State Farm opposed Green's motion and the trial court denied Green's motion. (R. 1492-
1493.) 
In May 1999, State Farm filed a motion for summary judgment on the grounds that, 
as a matter of law, Green had failed to obtain State Farm's written consent before settling 
with and releasing Murray. (R. 806-920.) Green opposed the motion and requested 
additional discovery pursuant to Rule 56(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (R. 1239-
1256.) The trial court granted Green's Rule 56(f) motion and deferred ruling on State Farm's 
motion for summary judgment, denying it without prejudice. (R. 1523-1525.) Green 
conducted her extensive requested discovery, including over 900 pages of deposition 
testimony. (R. 2874:86.) 
State Farm renewed it's motion for summary judgment in May of 2000. (R. 1877-
1878.) The trial court heard arguments. (R. 2874.) In Green's extensive discovery she was 
unable to find any evidence of either knowledge by State Farm of the settlement offer by 
Murray or that State Farm had denied Green permission to settle. (R. 2874:68-78, Partial 
Transcript of November 16,2000 Hearing, Addendum B.) Green again requested and was 
allowed to conduct further discovery including in-court testimony of witnesses. (R. 2874, 
2875.) After Green completed her further discovery, the trial court granted State Farm's 
motion for summary judgment and signed an Order entered on March 5, 2001. (R. 2875; 
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2850-2855.) Green appeals both the denial of her motion for partial summary judgment and 
the granting of State Farm's motion for summary judgment. (R. 2867-2869.) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
I. RESPONSE TO GREEN'S STATEMENT OF FACTS. 
While there are several sub-issues, this case presents the Court with two main issues. 
First, is the Consent to Settle provision valid and enforceable under Utah law. Second, if the 
Consent to Settle provision is valid and enforceable, did the trial court properly grant 
summary judgment to State Farm where it was undisputed that Green did not request or 
receive written consent from State Farm prior to entering into a settlement and release with 
Murray. 
In an attempt to construct factual disputes, Green spends much of her brief discussing 
various facts that are neither material nor relevant to the two legal questions set forth above. 
The Consent to Settle provision is either valid and enforceable under Utah law, or it is not. 
Either Green received written consent from State Farm to settle her claims against Murray, 
or she didn't. The determination of these two issues has nothing to do with many of the facts 
set forth in Green's brief. 
Green specifically misleads the Court and provides no reference to the record when 
she states in her "facts" that Green did not serve Murray with her lawsuit because of the 
"pending policy limit offer" and subsequent settlement with Murray's liability insurer. (See, 
Green Brief, p. 6.) Such a "fact" scenario never occurred. Furthermore, the claimed facts 
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are irrelevant to the central issue of whether Green obtained written consent from State Farm 
to settle with Murray. Green's personal motivation in serving or not serving her mother, 
Murray, with the lawsuit is irrelevant to the issue regarding Green's failure to obtain written 
consent pursuant to a contract with State Farm. More importantly, in "October 1995" there 
had been no offer to settle so there was no "pending policy limit offer." (R. 1952, 1933.) 
There was no "pending policy limit offer" until November 10, 1995. (R. 1933.) 
Green also states in her "facts" that State Farm knew Murray's $25,000 policy limit 
was insufficient to cover her damages. (See, Green Brief, p. 8.) Green fails to explain to the 
Court that the record cited is a letter to Louder's adjuster from Green's attorney and not 
Green's first-party UIM adjuster Bonnie Markham ("Markham). Green again states 
irrelevant facts. Whether State Farm knew or did not know Green had "damages" in excess 
of $25,000 has no legal consequence until Murray's insurance carrier offers Green the 
$25,000 limits and she then notifies and obtains written permission to settle pursuant to the 
policy terms. Green again aims for misdirection of the issues. 
Green also accuses State Farm of making a misrepresentation to the Court regarding 
adjusters sharing information on the files. (See. Green Brief, p. 8.) Green fails to tell the 
Court that she was the architect for sharing limited information when she specifically gave 
permission and direction for information to be shared. (R. 1945-1946.) While some 
information was to be shared, Green well understood that only Markham was handling the 
UIM file. (R. 2880:239-240.) Most important is that regardless of shared information Green 
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knew that as far as dealing with the UIM claims and obtaining permission she was to deal 
with Markham as she was the UIM adjuster. (R. 2880:231-239.) Green fails to cite any part 
of the record showing a nexus between the limited sharing of information that occurred and 
Green's own breach of the insurance contract by failing to obtain written permission to settle 
from State Farm. 
Lastly, Green states as "facts" that prior to settlement her attorney, Jackson Howard 
("Howard"), advised State Farm that Horace Mann, Murray's liability carrier, was tendering 
the $25,000 policy limits, that State Farm was asked to "quickly" give its Written consent" 
to settle but State Farm refused. Therefore, Green argues she settled only after "numerous 
unsuccessful attempts" to obtain written consent. (See, Green Brief, p. 11.) 
These "facts" are entirely unsupported by evidence in the record. It is absolutely clear 
that Green never obtained or sought written consent. (R. 1952, 2878:169.) Green fails to 
include Howard's cross examination where he specifically stated he did not remember who 
he talked to (R. 2878:169-170), what was said specifically (R.2878:170, 2878:294, 325), 
when it was said (R. 2878:170, 2880:295), that he kept no notes of the conversation (R. 
2880:179, 280, 296-297), and that he sent no confirming letters. (R. 2880:170, 179, 295.) 
Howard has never claimed that he got written permission to settle. (R. 2878:169.) Howard 
testified that he did not even obtain oral permission to settle. (R. 2880:295.) In fact, it seems 
clear that Howard decided on his own to settle without written permission because he 
unilaterally thought State Farm would not be harmed. (R. 2880:340.) Green's attorney only 
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claims that he obtained "implied" permission. (See, Green Brief, p. 35.) Green fails to cite 
any authority for how "implied" approval substitutes for a requirement to obtain written 
permission to settle her lawsuit with Murray pursuant to the terms of her contact with State 
Farm. Green cannot argue that she obtained any specific permission or that permission was 
withheld because she never asked for permission. Instead, Green misstates and argues 
irrelevant facts in an attempt to distract the Court from the real issues on appeal. 
Green has set forth a number of alleged facts without supporting them with citations 
to the record in violation of Rule 24(a)(7); (e) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
Thus, not only are these facts irrelevant to the issues at hand, but Green has failed to establish 
such facts for purposes of this appeal. In reality, many of the alleged facts set forth in 
Green's brief are not supported by the record. Accordingly, where Green has failed to 
support her factual allegations or the factual allegations are irrelevant even if true, they 
should not be considered by this Court. 
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS MATERIAL TO THE ISSUES PRESENTED. 
On July 13,1995, Green was a passenger in a car driven by Murray - her mother - in 
Provo Canyon. Murray negligently drove the automobile left of the center line, believing that 
the two-lane road was a divided four-lane road. (R. 39.) Lloyd Louder ("Louder") was 
driving a vehicle in the oncoming lane and collided with the Murray vehicle. (R. 38-39.) 
Green hired experienced counsel, Jackson Howard, four or five days after the accident. (R. 
2878:99.) In fact, Howard visited Green while she was still in the hospital. (R. 2878:21-22.) 
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Green claimed personal injuries from the collision and filed a lawsuit against both Louder 
and Murray. (R. 1-40.) 
Green had three automobiles insured under three different policies with State Farm 
at the time of the accident. (R. 38.) One was a California policy that provided UIM coverage 
with a policy limit of $50,000.l (R. 1968.) The other two were Utah policies that provided 
UIM coverage with policy limits of $ 100,000 each. (R. 1969-1970.) 
On September 27, 1995, Green's UIM file was assigned to State Farm adjuster 
Markham.2 (R. 1952,2881:60.) OnOctober5,1995, Green's attorney called Markham and 
provided some verbal information concerning Green's anticipated medical bills. (R. 1952.) 
On October 5, 1995, Murray's attorney verbally told Markham that Murray had a $25,000 
liability policy limit through Horace Mann. (R. 1952;2881:91-95.) At that time, Markham 
had not received medical records, medical bills or policy confirmation regarding the Horace 
Mann policy from Green's attorney. (R. 1952.) 
From the beginning of the claim, Green's attorney claimed that fault for the accident 
rested primarily with Louder and, therefore, that Murray's policy limits of $25,000 may 
therefore not even apply. (R. 2880:243-245.) From October 9, 1995, to October 20, 1995, 
1
 As there is no Consent to Settle provision in the California policy, State Farm 
has paid her UIM limit from this policy ($25,000 since California UIM offsets) and 
therefore this policy is not at issue in this appeal. 
2
 The two-month delay was due in part to difficulties - including a 
miscommunication from Green's counsel - in identifying the correct UIM policy. (R. 
1905.) Once the correct policy was identified, the UIM file was opened and assigned 
shortly thereafter. (R. 1907-1909.) 
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Green's attorney communicated with Horace Mann, Murray's insurance carrier, regarding 
personal injury protection (PIP) benefits and regarding the fact that Horace Mann needed 
medical reports, records and billings. (R. 1942-1944.) 
Despite Green's claim that Louder was largely at fault for the accident, Markham 
determined that negligence appeared to rest mainly with the UIM driver Murray. (R. 1952.) 
Accordingly, in late October, State Farm arranged to have an asset check performed to 
determine whether State Farm would be able to subrogate against Murray should the need 
arise.3 (R. 1952.) Consistent with this concern, on November 6,1995, Markham sent a letter 
to Green's attorney explaining that State Farm intended to obtain an asset check on Murray 
and reminding Green's attorney that Green's policy required that she obtain State Farm's 
written consent before entering into any settlement or release with Murray. (R. 1939; 
Addendum C.) 
Unbeknownst to State Farm, Four days later, on November 10, 1995, Horace Mann 
for the first time offered its $25,000 policy limit to Green on behalf of Murray. (R. 1933.) 
Without any notice to State Farm, on November 20, 1995, Green's attorney called Horace 
3
 State Farm eventually learned that Murray owned three California real properties 
free and clear and that it appeared there was some effort to conceal assets by Murray. (R. 
1880, 1899-1902.) In fact, after Green settled with Murray and executed a release, it was 
discovered through the taking of Murray's deposition that she owned cash assets of at 
least $133,000.00, which were deposited into Great Western Savings. (R. 1879-1897.) 
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Mann and indicated that he wanted to wait a couple of weeks before accepting the settlement. 
(R. 1933.) 
More than two months later, on January 26,1996, Green's attorney accepted Horace 
Mann's offer and requested a policy limit check of $25,000 and a release. (R. 1931,1933) 
At no time did Green ever contact State Farm to inform them of the policy limits offer or to 
ask permission to settle pursuant to the policy. (R. 1949-1952,2881:213-214.) Over the 
course of the next month, Green and Horace Mann finalized the release, including a request 
by Green that the release be changed to "protect us against claims from the other insurance 
companies which your release discharges." (R. 1929.) On February 16,1996, Green signed 
the Release of All Claims in favor of Murray, which Green's attorney returned to Horace 
Mann on February 27, 1996. (R. 1924-1927.) 
From November 6,1995, to March 7,1996, State Farm received no communication 
from Green regarding the UIM claim.4 (R. 1949-1952,2881:213-214.) On March 7,1996, 
Green's attorney sent Markham a letter, and for the first time demanded payment of State 
Farm's $100,000 UIM policy limit. (R. 1921-1922, March 7, 1996 letter, Addendum D.) 
Although the letter states that "[w]e have settled for the policy limits of Ms. Murray's 
insurance carrier for $25,000," it does not so much as hint that Green had ever requested nor 
4
 Green's attorney has no billing records, memos or log notes indicating that he 
communicated with State Farm from 11/6/95 to 3/7/96. (R. 2880:179,196) 
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obtained State Farm's consent - written or otherwise - to the settlement and release.5 (R. 
1945.) After receiving the above-referenced letter on March 11, 1996, Markham noted in 
her log that Green's attorney "indicates he has already settled the claim with primary carrier 
for $25,000 which would be a violation of policy." (R. 1950.) 
At all times, Green's counsel was fully aware of the terms and implications of the 
Consent to Settle provision and the requirement that Green must receive State Farm's written 
consent before settling with and releasing Murray. (R. 2878:169,2880:191-195.) Green's 
attorney in fact did advise Green that she would be cutting off her rights of any claim against 
Murray by signing the release. (R. 2880:371-403.) Green's attorney knew that by signing 
the release, State Farm's subrogation rights were destroyed.6 (R. 2880:195, 317.) Jackson 
Howard admitted that he never sent a letter to State Farm informing them that Green intended 
to cut off their subrogation rights. (R. 2880:318.) 
Knowing that Green had not obtained State Farm's written consent in violation of the 
policy, Green's attorney asked Murray's counsel if they would be willing to set aside the 
release. (R. 2880:385-390.) Murray's counsel sent a letter indicating that they were not 
5It should be noted that Green, through her attorney Jackson Howard, filed a bad 
faith lawsuit versus State Farm due to the denial of her UIM claims. An examination of 
that complaint is completely lacking in any allegations that Green ever notified State 
Farm of the policy limits offer or that permission to settle with Murray was ever 
requested. (R. 1601-1611, Bad Faith Complaint, Addendum E.) 
6
 In the trial court, the parties stipulated and the trial court signed an order stating 
that State Farm's subrogation rights against Murray have been extinguished. (R. 1549-
1542). 
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willing to set aside the release to revive State Farm's subrogation rights. (R. 2880:385-390.) 
The chronology of what occurred is documented in the record by a "time line" with 
referenced exhibits in the record indicating that during the relevant time period between the 
November 10,1995, offer of policy limits by Murray's carrier and Green's settlement with 
Murray there was no notice given to State Farm regarding the settlement and release and no 
written consent requested or received from State Farm before Green entered into a settlement 
and release with Murray. (R. 1998-1989-2234; 2240-2243; see Addendum F.) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
I. PURPOSE OF CONSENT TO SETTLE PROVISIONS. 
Practically all automobile liability insurance policies contain a clause that prohibits 
the insured from voluntarily assuming any liability, settling any claims, incurring any 
expense, or interfering in any legal proceedings or negotiations for settlement except with 
the - normally written - consent of the insurer. Such "Consent to Settle" provisions have 
generally been held valid. Taylor v. GEICO. 978 P.2d 740 (Haw. 1999). 
The clause protects the UIM insurer's subrogation rights against the tortfeasor, and 
guards against the possibility of collusion between the insured and the tortfeasor (or their 
liability carrier). See, Overstreet v. Safewav Ins. Co.. 740 So.2d 1053, 1057 (Ala. 1999) 
(providing policy reasons for consent to settle clause); Harrv v. Hawkeve Ins. Co.. 972 P.2d 
279 (Colo. 1998) (same). A UIM carrier, therefore, is able to pay its insured the UIM 
amount under the policy and attempt to collect that amount from the tortfeasor. When an 
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insured settles a claim against an underinsured tortfeasor without providing the UIM carrier 
the opportunity to consent to the settlement and release in writing, the effect is to destroy the 
subrogation rights of the UIM insurer. Unless the person being released has specific 
knowledge of the subrogation rights of the insurer, a general release will extinguish all 
subrogation rights. See, Educators Mut. Ins. Assoc, v. Allied Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co.. 890 P.2d 
1029 (Utah 1995).7 The effect of a release, therefore, destroys all rights of subrogation an 
insurer may have against a tortfeasor because it discharges all claims between the parties. 
See. Williams v. Greene. 506 P.2d 64 (Utah 1973) (a party may not execute a general release 
and then at a later date, bring claim for the same items of damages); Spivey v. Lowery. 446 
S.E. 2d 835 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994) (general release destroys subrogation rights of UIM 
carrier). 
With this purpose in mind, the following arguments show that the trial court correctly 
denied Green's motion for partial summary judgment and correctly granted summary 
judgment in favor of State Farm as Green failed to obtain written consent from State Farm 
prior to entering into a settlement and release with Murray. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT THE 
CONSENT TO SETTLE PROVISION IS VALID AND 
ENFORCEABLE UNDER UTAH LAW. 
The Utah State Legislature and this Court have recognized that the parties to an 
7
 Murray was asked in her deposition whether she had any knowledge of State 
Farm's subrogation interests. Murray testified that she had no such knowledge of any 
subrogation rights. (R. 2877:56, 71-74; Deposition of Marlene Murray). 
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insurance contract are free to contract as they see fit. This Court is joined by the majority of 
courts from other jurisdiction in equally applying these principles to UIM insurance. 
In this case it is beyond dispute that the Consent to Settle provision is clear and 
unambiguous as it openly informs an insured that she must obtain State Farm's written 
consent before she enters into a settlement with another party so that State Farm will have 
the opportunity to provide coverage benefits to the insured as well as have the opportunity 
to protect its own subrogation rights. Green, who was represented by an attorney at the time, 
understood the requirements of the provision and the implications behind it, but chose to 
enter into a settlement and release despite these requirements. 
It is equally clear that the Consent to Settle provision does not violate the Utah statutes 
governing UIM insurance or public policy flowing from the same. Green's argument to the 
contrary strains the language and intent of the UIM statutes and fails to consider the policies 
underlying the law. Consent to Settle provisions appear in almost every motor vehicle policy 
and courts all across the country agree that such provisions are a valid and proper means by 
which an insurer may protect its subrogation rights while still providing contractually 
mandated benefits to its insureds. 
As the trial court correctly determined that the Consent to Settle is valid and 
enforceable, it follows that the trial court correctly found that Green breached the insurance 
policy as it is undisputed that Green did not obtain State Farm's written consent before 
entering into a settlement and release with Murray. It is equally undisputed that State Farm 
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was prejudiced by Green's failure to notify or obtain State Farm's consent to the settlement 
as State Farm's subrogation rights against Murray - who had collectible assets - were 
destroyed by Green. 
Finally, the trial court correctly found that Green could not stack the UIM coverages 
from her three different State Farm policies. Utah law expressly forbids such practice and 
Green's attempts to stretch the statute go too far. 
In the end, this case presents two fairly straightforward issues. Are Consent to Settle 
provisions valid in Utah and if so, does the provision exclude Green from coverage where 
she undisputedly failed to get State Farm's written consent - and even failed to notify State 
Farm - before entering into a settlement and release with Murray. Because it is clear as a 
matter of law that Green failed to comply with a valid and enforceable Consent to Settle 
provision, the trial court's Orders should be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT THE "CONSENT TO 
SETTLE" PROVISION WAS VALID AND ENFORCEABLE. 
A. The Consent to Settle Provision Is Clear And Unambiguous. 
The Consent to Settle provision at issue in this case clearly provides as follows: 
When coverage "W" [UIM] does not apply: 
THERE IS NO COVERAGE: 
1. For any insured who, without our written consent, settles with any person 
or organization who may be liable for the bodily injury and thereby impairs the 
right to recover our payments. 
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(R. 11, 37; Policy Provisions, Addendum A) (emphasis added). 
Green briefly suggests that this Consent to Settle provision is somehow ambiguous, 
but fails to explain how the provision is subject to more than one interpretation. (See Green 
Brief, pp. 22-23.) Utah law regarding the interpretation of insurance policies is clear. A 
court must enforce a policy provision according to its plain terms. See, St. Paul Fire & 
Marine Ins. v. Commercial Union Assur., 606 P.2d 1206 (Utah 1980). A policy term is not 
ambiguous, however, merely because one party assigns a different meaning to it in 
accordance with his or her own interests. See, Camp v. Deseret Mut. Benefit Assn.. 589 P.2d 
780, 782 (Utah 1979); Village Inn Apartments v. State Farm, 790 P.2d 581, 583 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1990). 
In S.W. Energy Corp. v. Continental Ins., 974 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1999), this Court set 
forth the following standards regarding the construction of insurance policy provisions: 
An insurance policy is a contract between the insurer and the insured and, 
accordingly, is subject to the general rules of contract construction. Courts 
determine the legal import of insurance policies affording the policy terms 
their usually accepted meanings . . . . If a policy is not ambiguous . . . no 
presumption in favor of coverage arises; rather the policy language is 
construed pursuant to its ordinary meaning . . . . This rule . . . applies with 
equal force to policy provisions excepting certain losses from coverage. 
(Id. at 1242.)8 
8
 The Utah Court of Appeals also recently affirmed the basic principle that 
"[ilnsurance policies are merely contracts and should thus be interpreted under the same 
rules governing ordinary contracts." Cannon v. Travelers Indem. Co., 994 P.2d 824, 827 
(Utah Ct. App. 2000) (citing cases). 
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Moreover, an insurer "may exclude from coverage certain language which clearly and 
unmistakably communicates to the insured the specific circumstances under which the 
expected coverage will not be provided." Utah Farm Bureau Ins. Co. v. Crook. 980 P.2d 
685,686 (Utah 1999), quoting Alf v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.. 850 P.2d 1272,1275 (Utah 
1993). In addition, courts must enforce an unambiguous contract of insurance and "may not 
rewrite an insurance contract... if the language is clear." Id. at 687. 
Applying these principles to this case, it is undeniable that Green's UIM policy clearly 
required that Green needed to obtain State Farm's written consent before she settled her 
claims against Murray. The provision is straight forward and cannot be understood any other 
way. Thus, the policy must be interpreted to deny UIM coverage according to the plain and 
ordinary meaning of the provision.9 
B. The Consent to Settle Provision Is Valid And Does Not 
Violate Utah's Insurance Code. 
i. Failing to obtain consent before settlement destroys 
the right of subrogation 
9
 Even Green's attorney Jackson Howard testified at his deposition that he 
understood that he needed to have State Farm's written consent before settling Green's 
claims against Murray. Howard testified as follows: 
Q: [W]ould it be fair to say at the time you consummated the settlement 
you knew you didn't have their [State Farm's] written permission to 
settle? 
A: That's true 




The majority of courts that have considered this exact issue have found that where an 
insured fails to obtain written consent from the insurer before settling claims against a 
tortfeasor, thereby destroying the insurer's subrogation rights, the insured is not entitled to 
collect UIM benefits. This is especially true where the insured settles with the underinsured 
motorist.10 The Supreme Court in Hawaii did an extensive analysis throughout the country 
on consent to settle provisions and found the "validity of consent to settle provision has been 
widely litigated throughout the country... and a majority of jurisdictions have upheld such 
provisions in a UIM context." Taylor v. GEICO. 978 P.2d 740, 746 (Haw. 1999) (citations 
omitted). Stating the majority rule, the court in Klang v. American Family Ins. Group. 398 
N.W. 249 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986), held that: 
An insured who settles with and releases an underinsured tortfeasor before 
giving her insurer notice . . . is precluded from bringing an action against her 
insurer for underinsured benefits. 
Id. at 49." 
10
 See, e.g.. Brantley v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.. 586 So.2d 184 (Ala. 
1991); Gates v. Claret. 945 F.2d 102 (5th Cir. 1991); Argiro v. Progressive American Ins. 
Ca, 510 So.2d 635 (Fla. Ct. App. 1987); General Acci. Ins. Co. v. Taplis. 493 So.2d 32 
(FlaCt. App. 1986). 
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 See also. Fraioli v. Metropolitan. 748 A.2d 273 (R.I. 2000) (plaintiff is required 
to protect subrogation rights and obtain the consent of his or her UIM carrier before 
settling with tortfeasor or coverage will be denied); Hernandez v. Gulf Group. 875 
S.W.2d 691 (Texas 1994) (failure to obtain permission from the UIM carrier creates a 
breach of contract cause of action but prejudice must be shown); Erie v. Shapiro. 450 
S.E.2d 144 (Va. 1994) (a consent to settle provision was valid and claimant who settled 
without consent was not entitled to UIM coverage); Fireman's Fund Ins. v. Bragg. 58 
A.2d 5 (Md. Ct. App. 1988) (a consent to settle clause is valid); Kroniaeger v. West 
Virginia Corp.. 490 S.E.2d 657 (W. Va. 1997) (a consent to settle provision in a UIM 
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Allstate Ins. Co. v. Beavers. 611 So.2d 348 (Ala. 1992), is factually similar to the 
present case. In Allstate, the plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle accident involving his 
father. The plaintiff had an automobile liability policy that provided UIM benefits. 
However, coverage was subject to an exclusion if a settlement occurred with the tortfeasor 
without the insurer's written permission. Additionally, Allstate notified plaintiffs attorney 
of its subrogation rights under the policy and requested notification before the plaintiff 
signed any release. The plaintiff released the father and did not notify Allstate until after the 
fact. Allstate then requested evidence of the tortfeasor's policy limits; that the policy limits 
had been tendered; and also requested a list of medical expenses plaintiff incurred. Allstate 
wrote plaintiffs attorney that it had become aware that a release had been executed and 
asked for a copy of the release to determine how to proceed. 
Allstate filed a declaratory relief action requesting a declaration that UIM benefits 
were not available to plaintiff due to lack of consent before settling with the tortfeasor. The 
trial court denied Allstate's motion for summary judgment, the Alabama Supreme Court 
overturned the trial court holding that the consent to settle clause was valid and that settling 
without permission destroyed Allstate's subrogation rights. The court noted: 
policy that required an insured to first obtain permission from the UIM carrier before 
settling with the tortfeasor is valid but there must be prejudice); U.S. Fidelity and Guar. 
Co. v. Hellman. 367 So.2d 912 (Miss. 1979) (consent to settle valid and failure to seek 
consent prior to settlement voids coverage); Murriel v. Alfa Insurance. 697 So.2d 370 
(Miss. 1997) (consent to settle provisions are valid and essential to protecting the 
insurer's subrogation rights but may be waived if later permission is requested and is 
unreasonably withheld). 
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The purpose of consent-to-settle clauses in the uninsured/underinsured 
motorist insurance context is to protect the underinsured motorist insurance 
carrier's subrogation rights against the tort-feasor, as well as to protect the 
carrier against a possibility of collusion between its insured and the tort 
feasor's liability insurer at the carrier's expense. 
Allstate. 611 So.2dat352. 
The court then held that the plaintiff was precluded from making an underinsured 
motorist claim: 
Beavers settled with Alfa [the UIM driver's liability insurer] and did release 
Alfa's insured from all liability. Before doing this, Beavers did not provide 
Allstate with adequate notice of the proposed settlement and of the terms of 
the release, as required by the [policy], for Allstate to adequately protect its 
subrogation rights. Consequently, Allstate never had the opportunity to 
consent to, or to refuse to consent to, the settlement agreement entered 
into by Beavers. 
Id. at 353 (emphasis added). 
This is what occurred here. Green knew that her policy required written consent from 
State Farm before entering into a settlement and release with Murray. (R. 1928.) Despite 
such knowledge, without written notice to State Farm, and without written consent, Green 
settled her claims and released her mother, Murray, thereby destroying State Farm's 
subrogation rights. (R. 1915-1918,1934-1936,2881:213-213.) At no time was State Farm 
contacted and informed that a settlement was being offered, had been offered, or that 
settlement was imminent. (R. 1915-1918.) 
In another similar case, March v. Mountain States Mut. Casualty Co.. 687 P.2d 1040 
(N.M. 1984), an insured was involved in an accident with an underinsured motorist and 
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settled the claim without notice to or the consent of his UIM insurer. As part of the 
settlement, plaintiff executed a general release of the underinsured motorist and her insurer, 
Travelers Insurance Company. The insured then filed a claim against her own insurer 
seeking UIM benefits. The UIM insurer denied coverage because the insured had failed to 
obtain its consent prior to settling his claims and signing the release. The trial court found 
that as a matter of law, the insured's settlement with the underinsured motorist destroyed 
defendant's rights of subrogation, breached the policy, and thereby terminated the insurer's 
UIM obligations. 
On appeal, the New Mexico Supreme Court affirmed the grant of summary judgment 
in favor of the insurer. The court stated that 
We think it is well established that if an insured, without the knowledge of his 
insurer, effectively releases a wrongdoer from liability for a loss before 
payment of the loss has been made by the insurance company, he destroys any 
right of subrogation the insurer may have against the wrongdoer and is, 
thereafter, precluded from a recovery from this insurer under the policy. 
March, 687 P.2d at 1043. 
The March court held that the consent to settle provision was clear, valid and 
enforceable and that the insured's failure to obtain prior consent triggered the exclusionary 
clause of the consent provision of the policy. The court noted: 
The question of the validity of the consent provision is necessarily intertwined 
with the propriety of enforcing protection of subrogation rights in the 
underinsurance situation. The purpose of a consent-to-settle clause is to 
protect the insurer's subrogation rights. 
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Id at 1043. 
ii. The consent to settle provision does not violate Utah's 
Insurance Code. 
Green argues that because Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-302(l)(c) mandates that an 
insurer provide UIM coverage as part of motor vehicle insurance - unless affirmatively 
waived13 - an insurer is therefore barred from ever making UIM coverage conditional and 
from ever employing exclusionary provisions with respect to such coverage. Because the 
statute does not expressly allow the use of conditional or exclusionary provisions Green 
claims that the Consent to Settle provision in her policy is void. (See Green Brief, p. 15.) 
Clearly Green's position attempts to stretch the statute and ignores the principles 
underlying UIM insurance. First, nowhere are convent to settle clauses expressly prohibited. 
Secondly, Utah Code Ann. § 31A-1-103(2) provides that what is not prohibited by law is 
permitted. Third, it is a well-accepted principle, that "the parties to an insurance policy are 
free to define the exact scope of the policy's coverage and may specify the losses or 
encumbrances the policy is intended to encompass." Valley Bank & Trust Co. v. U.S. Life 
12See also. Archer v. State Farm Ins. Co.. 615 A.2d 779 (P.A. Super. 1992); Bogan 
v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co.. 521 N.E.2d 447 (Ohio 1988); Green v. The Cincinnati Ins. 
Co.. 2001 Ohio App. Lexis 5409; Weiker v. Motorist Mutual Ins. Co.. 694 N.E.2d 966 
(Ohio 1998); McDonald v. Republic-Franklin Ins. Co.. 543 N.E.2d 456 (Ohio 1989); 
Guaranty County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Kline. 845 S.W.2d 810 (Tex. 1992). 
13
 It is clear that the UIM statues require an insurer to make UIM coverage 
available to its insureds. However, pursuant to § 31A-22-302, the law oily mandates that 
UIM coverage be offered and is not required. Pursuant to § 31A-22-302(l)(c), the 
coverage is optional and may be waived, contrary to Green's argument that it is 
mandated. 
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Title Ins. Co.. 776 P.2d 933, 936 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (citing cases) (internal quotations 
omitted).14 Thus, an insurer may exclude from coverage certain losses by using "language 
which clearly and unmistakably communicates to the insured the specific circumstances 
under which the expected coverage will not be provided." Wagner v. Farmers Ins. Exch.. 
786 P.2d 763 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (citing cases). As such, where a court determines that 
conditional or exclusionary policy terms are clear and unambiguous, Utah courts will 
"interpret those terms in accordance with their plain and ordinary meaning"as they 'Svould 
be understood by the average, reasonable purchaser of insurance." Valley Bank, 776 P.2d 
at 936: Draughon v. CUNA Mut. Ins. Soc'v.. 771 P.2d 1105,1108 (UtahCt. App. 1989); see 
also. Bear River Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wright. 770 P.2d 1019, 1020 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (per 
curiam). 
Green cites Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Call, 712 P.2d 231 (Utah 1995), to argue that, 
because UIM protection is mandated by Utah statute, any condition, limitation or exclusion 
related to that coverage is unenforceable. Call is clearly inapplicable here.15 Call held that 
a household exclusion in an automobile policy was void because such exclusion completely 
14
 In fact, this Court has often commented on the importance of the principle of 
"freedom of contract" with respect to insurance contracts and has noted that the Utah 
Legislature has expressly indicated that "freedom of contract" be maintained and that 
written contracts be the primary means by which this freedom of contract [is] exercised." 
Nielsen v. O'Reilly. 848 P.2d 664, 668 (Utah 1992). See Utah Code Ann. § 31A-1-102, 
specifically stating Utah's public policy to "maintain freedom of contract and enterprise." 
15
 The Call decision dealt with mandatory liability coverage, not UM or UIM 
coverage from which the Utah statute allows an insured motorist to opt out. Thus, policy 
arguments discussed in Call are clearly inapplicable here. 
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barred insurance coverage for members of an insured's household in violation of Utah's 
Automobile No-Fault Act which required coverage and, unlike UIM coverage, cannot be 
waived. Also, unlike UIM coverage, the PIP statute expressly limits available exclusions to 
the enumerated U.C.A. § 31A-22-309(2)(a). Unlike the exclusion in Call, no part of the 
Green policy completely excludes UIM coverage. Here, as a condition precedent to receiving 
said benefits the insured must obtain State Farm's written consent before settling with the 
underinsured tortfeasor. The provision is crucial because it protects State Farm's subrogation 
rights against the tortfeasor as well as protects against the possibility of collusion. 
Arguments similar to Green's have been rejected by the Utah appellate courts. For 
example, similar to Green's assertions in the case at hand, in Crowther v. Nationwide Mut. 
Ins. Co.. 762 P.2d 1119 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), the plaintiff relied on CaU for the argument 
that an automobile policy provision prohibiting stacking of no-fault benefits, up to the 
amount of medical expenses actually incurred, was against public policy. The plaintiff 
argued that because the Utah Code only provided for certain enumerated exclusions 
pertaining to no-fault coverage, any condition or limitation regarding said coverage was void 
as against public policy. The Utah Court of Appeals disagreed: 
[Plaintiff] argues that the Other insurance provision is likewise invalid because 
it is not one of the permitted statutory exclusions. We find this argument 
untenable, however, because the provision is clearly not an exclusion, but a 
limitation. 
Crowther. 762 P.2d at 1121; see also. Utah Farm Bureau Ins. Co. v. Crook. 980 P.2d 685 
(Utah 1999) (insured's reliance on Call was misplaced where the policy clearly and 
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unambiguously precluded innocent co-insured from recovery for property loss caused by 
another insured). 
Green's reliance on the argument that the provision is unenforceable is not tenable. 
The clause merely pre-conditions UIM coverage to those instances where the insured obtains 
State Farm's written consent to settle. The provision properly protects State Farm's right to 
subrogation and does not artificially or arbitrarily exclude UIM coverage in violation of Utah 
statute. 
In addition, Green's position is contrary to the purpose of Utah's Motor Vehicle 
Financial Responsibility Act, which includes § 31A-22-302, et. seq. The main purpose of 
this Act is to ensure that every motorist has liability coverage at certain minimum limits (e.g., 
$25,000/$50,000). Under the Act, where an insurance policy is properly maintained, an 
insurer is required to provide coverage at these minimum amounts. Thus, where conditional 
or exclusionary provisions would deny such coverage at these minimums, they are typically 
found to be unreasonable. On the other hand, where such conditional or exclusionary 
provisions are not artificial or arbitrary and do not deny the minimum levels of coverage to 
the insured, such provisions are upheld. 
Furthermore, Green's position that consent to settle clauses violate legislation intent 
is inconsistent with recent legislative enactments. Recently amended § 31A-22-305 provides 
not only that a UIM carrier has a right to subrogation that arises out of the UIM context, but 
also provides for notification by the insured that a liability insurer has tendered its liability 
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policy limits. The statute provides: 
(12) (a) Within five business days after notification in a manner specified by 
the department that all liability insurers have tendered their liability policy 
limits, the underinsured carrier shall either: 
(i) waive any subrogation claim the underinsured carrier may have 
against the person liable for the injuries caused in the accident; or 
(ii) pay the insured an amount equal to the policy limits tendered by the 
liability carrier. 
(b) If neither option is exercised under Subsection (12)(a), the subrogation 
claim is deemed to be waived by the underinsured carrier. 
U.C.A. § 31A-22-305(12) (2001) (See Statutes, Addendum G.) 
The amendment to this statute did not change the law. The statute is in fact an 
expression of Utah's public policy in favor of UIM subrogation. A consent to settle 
provision has always been recognized as a valid method of protecting an insurance 
company's subrogation rights. The new statute now sets a limitation on how long an 
insurance company can wait before it gives consent to settle once it is actually notified in 
writing of a policy limits offer by the tortfeasor's carrier.16 This statute emphasizes the 
importance of subrogation to the UIM context. The requirement of § 31 A-22-305(12)(2001) 
that notice be made in a "manner specified by the department" requires that such notice be 
made in writing. (Utah Insurance Department Rules 590-211-4, See Addendum H.) 
Accordingly, it is appropriate under Utah public policy that insurers protect their subrogation 
rights by requiring the insured to obtain its written consent prior to abrogating such rights by 
16In the present case, an evaluation of "reasonableness" in giving or not giving 
permission is moot since there was never any notification or request for permission by 
Green to State Farm once Murray's policy limits were offered. 
26 
settling claims and entering into releases against tortfeasors. 
This Court has considered conditional and exclusionary language with respect to UIM 
coverage and has declined to follow Green's proposed position. In United States Fidelity and 
Guar. Co. v. Sandt 854 P.2d 519 (Utah 1993), this Court considered a number of issues 
surrounding a UIM policy. There, the Court recognized that an insurer may impose 
conditional or exclusionary provisions on UIM coverage, but that the insurer "must use 
explicit language if it intends to limit coverage by an exclusion." Id. at 524. Though the 
Court went on to find that the "Other Insurance" provision at issue was "less than clear," it 
remains that conditional and exclusionary provisions that apply to UIM coverage are 
acceptable if they are clear. Id at 525; see also. Nielsen v. O'Reilly. 848 P.2d 664 (Utah 
1992) (affirming use of limitation of liability provision to limit UIM coverage where such 
provisions are clear); Beck v. Farmers Insurance Exchange. 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985) 
(holding valid an excess coverage escape clause that allowed an insurer to limit the amount 
it paid on uninsured motorists' claims to the policy limit minus any insurance payments 
collected from another source where such provisions are clear). 
iii. The Consent to Settle Provision Does Not Violate Utah 
Public Policy and Is Not Unconscionable. 
Utah does not have a public policy against a consent to settle clause. As stated above, 
the requirements of notice of Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-22-305(12) specifically outline Utah's 
public policy of UIM subrogation requiring notice to the insurance company so that the 
subrogation rights can be protected. (See Addendum E.) Public policy favors freedom of 
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contract between the parties to an insurance contract unless there is a specific legal exclusion. 
See. Nielsen v. O'Reilly. 848 P.2d 664, 665-66 (Utah 1992). In Nielsen, this Court stated 
that absent legislative direction invalidating a clear provision it would undercut the express 
legislative policy regarding the regulation of the insurance industry that freedom of contract 
be maintained and that written contracts be the primary means by which the freedom of 
contract is expressed. Id. at 665-66.17 
Based on statutory expressions by the Utah Legislature, this Court has frequently 
commented on the requirements of public policy applicable to motor vehicle insurance. This 
Court has stated that "[p]ublic policy requires that persons purchasing [automobile liability] 
policies are entitled to be informed, in writing, of the essential terms of insurance contracts, 
especially exclusionary terms." Cullum v. Farmers Ins. Exch.. 857 P.2d 922 (Utah 1993); see 
also. Farmers Insurance Exchange v. Call. 712 P.2d 231,236 (Utah 1985); General Motors 
Acceptance Corp. v. Martinez. 668 P.2d 498, 501 (Utah 1983) (stating that "[t]he policy of 
the law is to prevent mistake or misunderstanding as to the terms of the insurance contract, 
or what in some cases may amount to sharp practice.") 
It is undisputed that the Consent to Settle provision of Green's policy fully complied 
with such public policy. The provision is clear and unambiguous. The provision expressly 
informs an insured that she must allow her insurer to protect is subrogation rights by 
17See also, U.C.A. § 31A-1-102(7), which specifically states the Utah policy in 
insurance contracts to "maintain freedom of contract and enterprise." 
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obtaining written consent prior to entering into settlements or releases against third parties. 
The provision could not be much more straightforward than in this case. Green, who was 
represented by an attorney at the time, knew that the provision applied to her settlement but 
decided to move forward even though she knew that she had not obtained written consent 
from State Farm. Because the Consent to Settle provision fully and clearly informed Green 
that she needed to obtain State Farm's written permission before entering into a settlement 
and release with her mother, it is not void as against public policy. 
Green argues that, hypothetically, the Consent to Settle provision could violate Utah 
public policy because it could allow State Farm to arbitrarily determine in its discretion when 
and if its insured could settle with an underinsured tortfeasor. This is a hollow argument. 
As set forth above, the Consent to Settle provision operates to allow the insurer the 
opportunity to protect its subrogation rights by either consenting to the settlement - thereby 
waiving its subrogation rights - or by paying the amounts the insured would have received 
via settlement, begin paying UIM benefits and pursue subrogation. There is no evidence in 
this case that State Farm has acted in an arbitrary or artificial manner. In fact, State Farm 
was not able to act at all because Green entered into a settlement and release without giving 
State Farm the opportunity to decide whether to consent or not. In reality, this argument is 
a red herring. Consent to Settle provisions exist so that an insurer may be put on notice that 
its subrogation rights are about to be effected, and thereby giving the insurer the opportunity 
to protect such rights. 
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Similarly, Green improperly relies upon statements of public policy and law applicable 
to insurance situations not applicable here. This lawsuit, which arises from a first-party 
insurance contract, is subject to different legal standards than many of those set forth in 
Green's brief. See, Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch.. 701 P.2d 795,799 (Utah 1985) (noting that 
"In the first-party situation, the insured and the insurer are, in effect and practically speaking, 
adversaries").18 Green's attempts to muddy the waters with policy references from other 
insurance situations aside, the issue before the Court is whether, as a matter of law, Green 
breached a valid Consent to Settle provision thereby invalidating her UIM benefits. This 
appeal should remain focused on the issue before the Court. 
As the Consent to Settle provision fully and clearly informed Green of the necessity 
of obtaining State Farm's written permission before entering into a settlement and release 
with Murray, it is clear that the provision complies with Utah public policy. 
Green briefly suggests - without explaining why or how - that the doctrine of 
unconscionability does not allow an insurer to protect its subrogation rights by use of a 
consent to settle provision. The doctrine of unconscionability of contract was summarized 
by this Court when it described an unconscionable contract as one where "[t]he inequality 
I8In Beck. 701 P.2d at 799, the court distinguishes the duty owed an insured in a 
third-party case and in a first-party case. In a third-party case where a third person has 
sued the insured, a fiduciary duty arises with the insurer to protect and defend the 
insured's interest and a tort cause of action may arise. In a first-party case - as in this 
case - where an insured makes a claim on his/her own policy the relationship is 
contractual. The relationship between the insured and insurer, as in this case, is 
adversarial. The contract outlines the duties of the parties. 
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'must be so strong and manifest as to shock the conscience and confound the judgment of 
any man of common sense'" or a contract where "no decent, fair-minded person would view 
the ensuing result without being possessed of a profound sense of injustice." Resource 
Management Co. v. Weston Ranch & Livestock Co., 706 P.2d 1028, 1041 (Utah 1985). 
Surely the use of the conditional language in the Consent to Settle provision - a 
standard provision found in nearly all motor vehicle insurance policies - is not so 
unreasonable as to shock the conscience. As discussed fully above, a majority of courts have 
found that such provisions are a valid and reasonable way for an insurer to protect their 
subrogation rights are not unconscionable. Taylor v. GEICO. 978 P.2d 740 (Haw. 1999); 
Estate of Harry ex rel. Harry v. Hawkeye-Security Ins. Co., 972 P.2d 279 (Colo. Ct. App. 
1998). 
C. State Farm Was Prejudiced By Green's Settlement And Release Of 
All Claims Against Murray. 
Green briefly argues that, the Consent to Settle provision is not enforceable because 
State Farm was not prejudiced by the destruction of its subrogation rights. The issue of 
whether prejudice is required in consent to settle cases has not been decided in Utah. 
However, prejudice in the present case is undisputed. Even courts that take a narrow view 
of consent to settle provisions in UIM policies traditionally hold that, where the insurer was 
actually prejudiced by the settlement and release, the denial of coverage for failure to comply 
with the consent to settle provision is upheld. See, e.g.. Phillips v. N.H. Ins. Co.. 263 F.3d 
1215 (10th Cir. 2001) (where an insured fails to obtain prior written consent as required under 
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a UM policy and an insurer shows that it was prejudiced by the settlement, the insurer may 
deny UM coverage) (applying Oklahoma law). 
The effect of a release between a tortfeasor and a potential plaintiff is to discharge all 
claims between the parties. See. Spivev v. Lowerv. 446 S.E.2d 835 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994). 
The result of such a release is to destroy all rights of subrogation an insurer may have against 
a potential tort feasor. See, Educators Mut. Ins. Assoc, v. Allied Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co.. 890 
P.2d 1029 (Utah 1995); Buchanan v. Buchanan. 353 S.E.2d 406 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987). In 
Utah, unless the person being released has specific knowledge of the subrogation rights of 
the insurer, a general release will extinguish all subrogation rights. See. Id. In the present 
case, Murray did not have such knowledge. (R. 2877: 56, 71-74, Deposition of Marlene 
Murray.) 
It is undisputed that Green's settlement and release of Murray without written consent 
from State Farm destroyed State Farm's subrogation rights against Murray. It is equally clear 
that, had State Farm been given the opportunity to protect its subrogation rights, Murray had 
collectable assets that could have satisfied a subrogation judgment. Because State Farm was 
actually prejudiced in this case, State Farm has no obligation to pay UIM benefits to Green 
where she failed to obtain State Farm's written consent prior to entering into a settlement and 
release with Murray. 
The prejudice to State Farm is more than just theoretical. After Green entered into a 
settlement and release with her mother Murray, it was discovered that Murray had substantial 
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assets at the time of the accident. (R. 1899-1902,1879-1897.) In fact, it was determined that 
Murray had cash assets in the amount of $133,000 and real estate owned free and clear -
other than her personal residence - valued at $57,170.19 (See Footnote 3.) 
State Farm does not have to prove that, in fact, eventual collection of these assets 
would have occurred. As a practical matter, this would be impossible since the right to 
attempt such collection was terminated by Green. State Farm only need show that the rights 
of subrogation were impaired and, if that includes a showing of prejudice, then at the time 
that Green released Murray the assets that State Farm would have looked to in order to 
determine whether to waive their right to subrogation and grant written permission is the time 
frame that becomes important. Since the above mentioned assets existed at the time of 
Murray's release in a form that would be collectible there is prejudice as a matter of law. 
Because State Farm's right of subrogation was destroyed by the release of Murray it was 
19
 None of these assets were subject to any protection by the law. (See California 
Civil Code §§ 910(2) and 704.930). It is well-established California law that the debts of 
one spouse are the debts of another: 
Except as otherwise expressly provided by statute, the community estate is 
liable for debt incurred by either spouse before or during the marriage, 
regardless of which spouse has the management and control of the property 
and regardless of whether one or both spouses are parties to the 
debt or judgment for the debt. 
California Civil Code § 910(a). 
Furthermore, Green's reliance on the homestead exemptions under California law 
is misplaced. California Civil Code § 704.930 states that in order to obtain homestead 
protection, the property must be "the principle dwelling of the homestead owner or such 
person, spouse" and further requires that the homestead owner or such person or spouse 
"reside and declare homestead." California Civil Code § 704.930. 
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necessarily prejudiced. 
Green argues about whether Murray had enough assets to cover any possible UIM 
payment from State Farm. This is an irrelevant issue. The issue according to the plain 
language of the policy is whether State Farm's right to recover has been impaired, not 
whether State Farm actually collects all the money. The undisputed facts clearly show that 
State Farm not only would have had the right to recover but would have possessed the actual 
ability to recover as against Murray. 
Thus, the simple fact remains that Green's failure to obtain State Farm's written 
consent prior to entering into a settlement and release with Murray terminated State Farm's 
subrogation rights which, in this case, were certainly more than theoretical. Because Green's 
failure specifically prejudiced State Farm's subrogation rights, it is clear that application of 
the Consent to Settle provision is proper in this case. 
II. BECAUSE GREEN FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE CONSENT TO 
SETTLE PROVISION THE COURT PROPERLY GRANTED STATE 
FARM'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
A. It Is Undisputed That Green Failed To Comply With The Written 
Consent To Settle Provision. 
Despite extensive discovery at the trial court, it remains undisputed that Green never 
had written consent from State Farm to enter into a settlement and release with Murray, 
thereby destroying State Farm's subrogation rights. Even Green does not oppose this 
argument in her brief. Accordingly, it is clear that Green breached the insurance contract and 
that she is not entitled to UIM benefits under the policy. 
34 
The undisputed facts of this case show that Green denied State Farm the opportunity 
to protect its subrogation rights. From August 1, 1995 to October 20, 1995 it is clear that 
State Farm, Green's attorney and Horace Mann were actively gathering the facts and data 
pertaining to the various claims. Indeed, as of October 9, 1995 Horace Mann had not yet 
even received many of the medical reports, records and billings from Green's counsel. On 
November 6, 1995 State Farm adjuster Bonnie Markham sent a letter to Green's counsel 
specifically stating that before State Farm could authorize Green to sign a release, State Farm 
needed to (1) receive verification of the Horace Mann policy limits, (2) perform and asset 
check on Murray and (3) receive verification that the Horace Mann limits had been 
demanded. (R. 1939.) However, Green ignored this letter. Instead, on November 10,1995 
Horace Mann offered its policy limits to Green and Green took the check and executed a 
Release of All Claims on February 16,1996 without even notifying State Farm concerning 
the same. 
Green knew that her insurance policy required written consent from State Farm prior 
to settlement. Green admitted that no such written permission was provided. Despite the fact 
that Green knew that State Farm had not provided the written consent she decided to proceed 
with executing the Release. In sum, State Farm never even had the opportunity to evaluate 
and decide whether they would give consent for Green to release Murray. Again, State Farm 
could have fronted the $25,000 limits to Green along with UIM benefits and attempted 
collection against Murray. Green would have received all of the benefits of her desired 
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settlement without destroying State Farm's subrogation rights. Murray had assets that State 
Farm could attempt to collect against. Therefore, when Green released Murray without State 
Farm's written consent, State Farm was prejudiced by Green's failure. 
B. Factual Issues Do Not Preclude Summary Judgment In Favor Of 
State Farm. 
Green argues that three separate issues of material fact precluded the trial court's entry 
of summary judgment in this case. In reality, these purported factual disputes are either 
entirely unsupported by the record or are completely irrelevant to the issues before the Court. 
i. Howard's purported discussion with someone at State Farm. 
As set forth above, it is undisputed that Green did not have written consent from State 
Farm prior to settling the claims against Murray and release her from all related claims. 
Instead, Green seems to propose that it was sufficient that Howard purportedly had a 
discussion with an unidentified person at State Farm to go ahead with settlement. Green's 
position fails for at least three reasons. First, even if Howard - or someone from his office 
- did in fact have a discussion that could be interpreted as a type of consent, it remains 
undisputed that there was no written consent to settle as the policy requires. In fact, the very 
reason that insurance policies require such written consent is to avoid the very scenario 
constructed by Green where it becomes one person's word against another as to whether a 
discussion occurred and as to what was actually said or intended during the discussion. 
Second, it is undisputed that the purported discussion between Green's attorney and 
someone at State Farm did not occur until after Green had already settled her claims against 
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Murray and released her from all future claims. It is undisputed that Green settled with 
Murray, through her carrier, Horace Mann, on January 26,2001, leaving only the details to 
be worked out.20 (R. 1929,1933.) Even if the Court deems Howard's testimony admissible 
and sufficient to establish that he requested permission to settle from State Farm, it would 
be too late since such request, according to Howard's own testimony, occurred sometime in 
February. (R. 2878:169, 2880:293.) 
Third, it is clear that the facts surrounding the purported verbal communication 
between Howard - or someone at his office - and someone at State Farm are so nebulous and 
speculative that they cannot form a genuine issue of material fact.21 In this case, Howard 
testified that he, or perhaps someone at his office, had a discussion with somebody at State 
Farm regarding settlement of the claims against Murray. (R. 2880:300-301.) Howard was 
unable to recall whether in fact he spoke with a person at State Farm or whether it would 
have been someone on his staff. (R. 2880: 324-326.) Similarly, Howard was not able to 
recall who at State Farm the discussion would have been with. (R. 2878:170, 2878:294, 
20
 In John Deere Co. v. K&H Equipment. Inc.. 876 P.2d 880 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), 
the court held that an acceptance of an offer to settle by telephone was valid at the date 
and time of the telephone call, even though a release was not signed subsequently due to 
disagreements as to the content of the release. The Utah Court of Appeals held that an 
oral agreement constituted the contract of settlement. Therefore, in the present case, 
Green settled with Murray on January 26, 1998, and any alleged discussions by Howard, 
even if admissible, came after. 
21
 A witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient to 
support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter. Utah R. Evid. 
602. 
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325.) Howard was unable to recall the specific date on which the call would have occurred. 
(R. 2878:170, 2880:295.) In fact, Howard was not able to verify the purported discussion 
through any memos, notes or correspondence. (R. 2880:179, 280, 284, 296-297.) State 
Farm's records were similarly void of record of any such communication. (R. 1952.) As 
such, any evidence that Mr. Howard had a conversation with State Farm resulting in 
permission or waiver is inadmissible for purposes of summary judgment.22 There simply is 
no foundation for his testimony, the best that can be said is that he cannot recall.23 As such, 
Green's attempt to use Howard's inability to recall to create a question of fact is improper. 
ii. Green's damages are irrelevant as the made whole doctrine 
does not apply to UIM subrogation and as Green was no 
longer legally entitled to recover once she released Murray. 
Next, Green claims that summary judgment cannot be granted until Green's damages 
have been established as it is possible - if Green's damages were high enough - that 
Murray's assets would have been exhausted before State Farm exercised its subrogation 
rights. Essentially, Green argues that she is entitled to be made whole before State Farm has 
any right of subrogation. However, the "made whole" argument does not apply for two 
22
 State Farm objected in the lower court as to the admissibility of Howard's 
testimony. (R. 2342-2365.) 
23There is no dispute that written permission to settle was never given. However, it 
should also be noted that Green's attorney has never claimed that he obtained oral 
permission to settle either. (R. 2880:295.) In fact, it was Green's attorney's position that 
he did not need permission to settle. (R. 2880:320.) Green's argument is that some sort 
of "implied" permission arose from her attorney's vague recollections of phone calls at 
unspecific times with unspecific persons. (R. 2878:169, 170.) 
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reasons: (1) it is an equitable principle and this is a breach of a contractual provision; and (2) 
allowing State Farm to subrogate against Murray has nothing to do with Green being made 
whole. 
The equitable principle of being made whole typically applies to third-party 
lienholders, such as a medical provider, who does not have a contract of reimbursement with 
the plaintiff. If a contract for reimbursement is in place those provisions govern and the 
made whole doctrine does not apply. Educators Mutual v. Allied, 890 P.2d 1029 (Utah 
1995). 
The "made whole" doctrine applies where there is insufficient settlement money to 
fully compensate a claimant and there is someone, like a medical provider, who has an 
equitable interest in the settlement proceeds. In such cases the plaintiff is allowed to recover 
the limited funds of settlement without the equitable lienholder getting reimbursement under 
the principle that the plaintiff was not made whole by the limited settlement. See. Hill v. 
State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co.. 765 P.2d 864 (Utah 1988). 
That is not the case here. Green can certainly argue that her recovery against Murray 
of $25,000 did not make her "whole." However, State Farm is not claiming and has never 
claimed an interest against Green for whatever funds she was to be paid. State Farm has 
never been a lienholder or claimed a direct interest in those funds against Green. Rather, 
State Farm's rights are based in subrogation against Murray if State Farm has to pay UIM 
benefits to Green. If such were paid to Green, State Farm would still not be claiming a lien 
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in such payments to Green. State Farm would be only looking at Murray for collections. The 
"made whole" doctrine does not apply to Murray. Green has no legal interest in preventing 
subrogation against Murray and therefore the made-whole doctrine does not apply to her.24 
Green wanted to forego all claims against Murray, the tortfeasor, in exchange for payments 
of insurance limits. The subrogation right against Murray would not lessen any payment to 
Green. In fact, the opposite is true. The more State Farm were to pay Green under UIM 
coverage the greater State Farm's subrogation rights would be against Murray. 
In a typical case Green and State Farm's interests would be the same. Green would 
try to maximize her recovery in claiming UIM benefits and to the extent they were made 
State Farm would have subrogation rights against Murray. In essence, UIM coverage is a 
substitute for Green. Instead of having to chase Murray for having inadequate insurance she 
could make the same claims against her UIM coverage with State Farm. Clearly Green was 
more interested in protecting the tortfeasor than in complying with the policy. 
Even if somehow the made-whole argument were to apply, Green's release of her 
mother leaves her with "unclean hands" and therefore unable to request from a court in 
equity that the "made-whole" doctrine applies. 
Furthermore, Green ignores the definition of "coverage" in this case. "Coverage" for 
UIM benefits does not commence under Utah Code Ann. §3 l-A-22-305(9)(a) and (b) until 
24
 Green's attorney specifically indicated Green had no interest in pursuing her 
mother's assets. (R. 2880:252-253) 
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there is a "legal right'' to recover. 
(a) Underinsured motorist coverage under 31A-22-302(l)(c) provides 
coverage for covered persons who are legally entitled to recover 
damages from owners or operators of underinsured motor vehicles 
because of bodily injuries... (Emphasis added) 
(b) The named insured's underinsured motorist coverage as described in 
(9) (a) is secondary to the liability coverage of an owner or operator of 
an underinsured motor vehicle... as described in subsection (8). 
For an insured to satisfy the "legally entitled to recover" statutory requirements and 
thereby have underinsured motorist coverage, there must be a viable claim that is capable of 
being reduced to a judgment. Peterson v. Utah Farm Bureau Ins. Co.. 927 P.2d 192 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1996), cert denied, 934 P.2d 652 (Utah 1997). Once Green settled with Murray and 
forever released her there was no longer any legal entitlement to recover against Murray and 
therefore no UIM coverage. 
iii. Whether State Farm knew or should have known of Green's 
settlement. 
Green also argues that summary judgment was precluded because "material fact 
questions existed with regard to whether State Farm knew or should have known of Mrs. 
Green's proposed settlement with Mrs. Murray."25 (See, Green Brief, p. 31.) Green claims 
that it was obvious to State Farm that given the liability of Murray and high damages of 
Green, a settlement offer for the policy limits of $25,000 would be made by Murray's insurer 
Horace Mann. (See, Green Brief, p. 32.) As the trial court recognized, it is clear that this 
25
 This claim is ironic given that, from the beginning of the claim, Green argued 
that fault rested primarily with Louder. (R. 2880:243-245.) 
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purportedly disputed fact is neither material nor relevant to a determination of whether Green 
obtained written consent from State Farm to enter into a settlement and release with Murray, 
thereby destroying State Farm's ability to pursue its subrogation rights. 
Moreover, how State Farm could have divined the intent of Green and another 
insurance carrier with respect to a settlement offer where there were two possibly negligent 
defendants, and how State Farm could have somehow anticipated the timing of such an offer 
is beyond explanation. This is especially true given the timing. State Farm was told that 
Murray had a $25,000 policy limit on October 5, 1995. (R. 1952.) Green then filed suit 
against Louder and Murray. On October 20, 1995, Green provided Horace Mann with 
medical bills in the amount of $3,270 and a Personal Injury Protection Form. (R. 1943.) On 
October 31, 1995, State Farm determined that negligence appeared to rest largely with 
Murray. (R. 1950.) Six days later, State Farm sent Howard the November 10, 1996, letter 
reminding him that the policy required written consent from State Farm before Green entered 
into any possible future settlement or release with Murray. (R. 1939.) Four days later, 
Horace Mann offered its $25,000 policy limits which were later accepted by Green without 
any notice to or consent from State Farm. (R. 1933.) 
From August 1,1995 to October 20,1995 it is clear that State Farm, Green's attorney 
and Horace Mann were actively gathering the facts and data pertaining to the respective 
claims. Indeed, as of October, 1995 Horace Mann had not yet received many of the medical 
reports, records and billings from Green's counsel. (R. 1946-1947) On November 6,1995, 
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State Farm adjuster Bonnie Markham sent a letter to Green's counsel specifically stating that 
before State Farm could authorize Green to settle and sign a release, State Farm needed to 
(1) receive verification of the Horace Mann policy limits, (2) perform an asset check on 
Murray, and (3) receive verification that the Horace Mann limits had been demanded. (R. 
1939) Green ignored this letter. Instead, without notifying State Farm that Horace Mann had 
offered its policy limits to Green on November 10,1995, Green accepted the settlement offer 
on January 26,1995 and executed a Release of All Claims on February 16,1996 without ever 
obtaining State Farm's written consent as is unequivocally required by the terms of the policy. 
Green could have easily sent State Farm a copy of the proposed settlement documents 
so that State Farm could provide written consent, but Green did not. Horace Mann offered 
the policy limits on November 10, 1995. Green did not formally accept the offer until 
January 26,1996 more than two months later over the telephone. (R. 2880:292-293.) During 
that time, counsel for Green never took the opportunity to even provide State Farm notice of 
the settlement offer. Nevertheless, Green's attorney did take the time to request changes in 
the Release language from Horace Mann, but obviously chose not to share that information 
with State Farm. Green knew that her insurance policy required written consent from State 
Farm prior to settlement. Green admitted that no such written permission was provided. 
Despite knowing that State Farm had not provided the written consent, Green proceeded, 
upon the advice of counsel, to execute the Release. There can be no doubt that Green 
breached the plain and unambiguous express terms of the contract and is therefore not 
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entitled to UIM benefits. Since Murray had assets against which State Farm could have 
subrogated, when Green released Murray without State Farm's written consent, State Farm's 
rights were irreparably prejudiced. 
C. State Farm Did Not Waive the Consent To Settle Provision. 
As her final argument, Green argues that State Farm waived the provision when a 
person from State Farm purportedly "implicitly consented to the settlement" and when it 
"withheld written consent." (Green Brief, p. 35.) However, not only do such claims fail to 
relieve Green from the clear language of the policy, but the undisputed facts of this case do 
not support this claim. 
A waiver is an intentional relinquishment of a known right where one's actions or 
conduct must be distinctly made, must unequivocally display an intent to waive and must be 
inconsistent with any other intent. See, Sotter's Inc. v. Deseret Fed. Sav. and Loan. 857 P.2d 
935 (Utah 1993). Clearly, State Farm's letter of November 6,1995, reminding Howard that 
Green would - as required by her policy - need to obtain State Farm's written consent before 
entering into any future settlement or release with Murray shows that State Farm did not 
knowingly relinquish its rights under the policy. (R. 1939.) In addition, Green's attorney 
testified that he never had oral permission to settle with Murray from State Farm. (R. 
2880:295.) Therefore, no waiver could have occurred. 
Moreover, as set forth above, given that the purported discussion between Howard's 
office and someone at State Farm occurred after the settlement had been agreed to and given 
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that the circumstances surrounding the alleged discussion are so nebulous, it is clear that 
State Farm did not affirmatively waive the Consent to Settle provision. 
Furthermore, there is nothing in the record to support Green's claim that State Farm 
somehow withheld written consent to Green's settlement. It is undisputed fact that Green 
never asked State Farm for written consent. State Farm could not read Green's mind as to 
whether she intended to pursue or accept a settlement offer from Murray. Nor could State 
Farm read the mind of the Horace Mann personnel who eventually made a settlement offer 
to Green. All State Farm could do was remind Green that before she did accept any 
settlement, she need to get State Farm's prior written consent. State Farm did so on 
November 6, 1995. (R. 1939.) 
Finally, Green's waiver argument fails given that Howard has testified that he knew 
that the State Farm policy required him to get State Farm's written consent before accepting 
Horace Mann's settlement offer but that he chose to move forward anyway. (R. 2878:320.) 
As everyone knew that State Farm was specifically reserving its rights under the Consent to 
Settle provision, Green's waiver argument is without merit. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT GREEN 
COULD NOT "STACK" HER UIM POLICIES. 
Green argues that she should be allowed to stack all three UIM policies for coverage 
in the aggregate amount of $250,000. While this issues is not relevant given that Green 
failed to obtain State Farm's written consent before entering into a settlement and release 
with Murray, it remains that Green has no basis under Utah law for such a claim. Utah Code 
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Ann. § 31A-22-305(10)(b)(i) states: 
The limits of liability for underinsured motorist coverage for two or more 
motor vehicles may not be added together, combined, or stacked to determine 
the limit of insurance coverage available to an injured person for any one 
accident. 
Green argues that § 31 A-22-305(10)(b)(c) allows stacking for an accident involving 
an unowned vehicle. However, Green fails to cite the rest of the statutory provision, § 31A-
22-305(10)(c)(iii): 
A covered person as defined under Subsection 10(c)(i)(B) is entitled to the 
highest limits of underinsured motorist coverage afforded for any one vehicle 
that the covered person is the named insured or an insured family member 
(Emphasis added) 
Pursuant to the statute, read in its entirety, even if no breach of the agreement by 
Green is assumed, at best Green is entitled to the highest limit from one of the vehicles 
covered with UIM benefits which is one of the Utah policies for $100,000.00. 
Green also claims that in USF&G v. Sandt 854 P.2d 519 (Utah 1993), this Court 
mandated stacking of UIM policies on each other. (Green Brief, p. 21.) However, Sandt9 s 
reference to stacking is limited to the stacking of UIM on top of a liability policy. There was 
never a holding that separate UIM policies had to stack on each other. See, Sandt. 854 P.2d 
519. 
IV. GREEN IS NOT ENTITLED TO UIM BENEFITS UNDER THE 
SUBROGATION CLAUSE OF THE POLICY. 
In a classically circular argument, Green claims that the State Farm policy itself allows 
Green to recover UIM benefits despite the fact that she undisputedly failed to obtain State 
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Farm's written consent before entering into a settlement and release with Murray. After 
g? rerally explaining how insurance contracts are supposed to be interpreted, Green claims 
that the Consent to Settle provision only applies after Green impaired State Farm's right to 
recover. (See Green Brief, pp. 23-24.) Green reasons that State Farm's right to recover 
never matured in this case because State Farm never paid anything out to Green. 
Green's argument stretches the policy and logic to the breaking point. Green would 
have this Court construe the State Farm policy to allow an insured to first settle a case against 
a tortfeasor, thereby destroying State Farm's subrogation rights, and then turn around and 
demand UIM benefits claiming that - despite settlement - she was still legally entitled to 
benefits arising out of the tortfeasor's negligence. 
As numerous courts have found, the Consent to Settle provision is designed to allow 
an insurer to be put on notice that its future subrogation rights are about to be effected by a 
settlement, thereby allowing the insurer to simultaneously provide benefits to the insured 
while protecting its own subrogation rights. Under the Consent to Settle provision, the 
insurer has to option to consent to settlement, pay its insured the amounts she would have 
received from the tortfeasor and begin paying UIM benefits while it pursues subrogation 
against the liable party. On the other hand, the insurer may simply waive its subrogation 
rights - which typically occurs where the tortfeasor has no assets to pursue. If the insurer 
elects to pursue subrogation, it is of course entitled to those amounts that it ultimately pays 
to its insured. 
47 
Putting the cart before the horse, Green argues that State Farm doesn't even have a 
subrogation right until it has first paid UIM benefits to her. This argument misses the point. 
Had Green given State Farm notice that she was about to settle with Murray, State Farm 
could have paid Green the $25,000 she would have received from Murray, began paying 
UIM benefits to Green, and pursued Murray for the amounts it had and would continue to 
pay Green. Green's knowing failure to notify and get consent from State Farm denied State 
Farm the opportunity to act in a manner that would have provided full benefits to Green 
while still allowing State Farm to protect its own interests. As described fully throughout 
this brief, courts simply do not allow an insured to knowingly prejudice the rights of her 
insurer and at the same time receive UIM benefits. 
CONCLUSION 
The facts of this case, when examined in the light of day, unfiltered by Green's 
misdirection, show what actually occurred. Green never sought written or oral permission 
to settle. Green wanted to release Murray, her mother, from any potential liability. Green's 
attorney never intended to obtain permission because he decided on his own State Farm 
would not be hurt. These were deliberate actions taken by Green. 
An analysis of what occurred in Green's allowed 56(f) discovery bring illumination 
to Green's tactics. Green was not really seeking evidence in discovery that State Farm had 
given any type of permission to settle with Murray. Green's overwhelming tactic in the 
discovery conducted was to try and find evidence that somehow State Farm had obtained 
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knowledge of the proposed settlement offer from someone other than Green. (See 
Addendum B.) The reason is simple - Green never sought permission from State Farm. In 
Markham's deposition, the person Green knew was handling the UIM claim and who would 
be the only one with any knowledge of offers that were communicated, Green spent the entire 
deposition without even asking if Green ever asked permission to settle. (2881:213-215.) 
For seven hours Green questioned the adjuster that Green claims Howard "might" have 
talked to about the policy limits offer without ever asking if that ever occurred. (R. 
2281:213.) The reason why this question was never asked is simple - Green never asked for 
permission to settle as required by her contract with State Farm. 
For the reasons set forth above, it is clear that the trial court correctly determined that 
consent to settle clauses are valid and enforceable under Utah law. Furthermore, it is clear 
that the trial court properly found that, because Green had failed to obtain State Farm's 
written consent before entering into a settlement and release with Murray, Green was not 
entitled to UIM benefits. Moreover, it is clear that the trial court correctly held that Green 
cannot 'stack9 the amounts of the three UIM policies. As such, this Court should affirm the 
trial court's orders denying Green's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and granting State 
Farm's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
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SECTION m - UNINSURED MOTOR VEHICLE - COVERAGE U ALND 
UNDERINSURED MOTOR VEHICLE - COVERAGE W 
UNINSURED MOTOR VEHICLE - COVERAGE U 
You have this coverage if "IT appears in the "Coverages" 
space on the declarations page. 
We will pay damages for bodily injury an insured is legaDv 
entitled to collect from the owner or driver of an uninsured 
motor vehicle. The bodily injury must be caused by accident 
arising out of the operation, maintenance or use of an 
uninsured motor vehicle. 
Uninsured Motor Vehicle - means: 
1. a land motor vehicle, the ownership, maintenance 
or use of which is: 
a. not insured or bonded for bodily injury liability 
at the time of the accident; or 
b. insured or bonded for bodily injury liability at 
the time of the accident; but 
(1) the limits of liability are less than requi&i 
by the financial responsibility act of the 
state where your car is mainly garaged; or 
(2) the insuring company denies coverage or 
is or becomes insolvent; or 
2. an unidentified "hit-and-run" land motor vehicle 
which was the proximate cause of the bodily injury. 
The insured must show the existence of the other 
motor vehicle by clear and convincing evidence, 
which shall consist of more than the insured's 
testimony. 
i 
An uninsured motor vehicle does not include a land motor 
vehicle: l 
1. insured under the liability coverage of this policy;* 
2. furnished for the regular use of you
 f your spouse or 
any relative; 
3. owned or operated by a self-insurer under any 
motor vehicle financial responsibility law, a motor 
carrier law or any similar law; 
4. owned by any government or any of its political 
subdivisions or agencies; 
5. designed for use mainly off public roads except 
while on public roads; or 
6. while located for use as premises. 
Who Is an Insured 
Insured — means the person or persons covered by 
uninsured motor vehicle coverage. 
This is: 
2. 
you, your spouse and your relatives; and 
any other person while occupying: 
a. your car, a temporary substitute car, a newly 
acquired car or a trailer attached to such car. 
Such vehicle has to be used within the scope of 
the consent of you or your spouse; or 
b. a car not owned by you, your spouse or any 
relative, or a trailer attached to such a car. It 
has to be driven by the first person named in 
the declarations or that person's spouse and 
within the scope of the owner's consent 
Such other person occupying a vehicle used to carry 
persons for a charge is not an insured. 
3. any person entitled to recover damages because of 
bodily inptry to an insured under 1. and 2. above. 
Deciding Fault and Amount 
Two questions must be decided by agreement between the 
insured and us: 
1. Is the insured legally entitled to collect damages 
from the owner or driver of the uninsured motor 
vehicle; and 
2. If so, in what amount? 
If there is no agreement, these questions will be decided by 
arbitration upon written request of the insured. Each party 
shall select a competent and impartial arbitrator. These two 
shall select a third one. If unable to agree on the third one 
within 30 days either party may request a judge of a court 
of record in the county in which the arbitration is pending 
to select a third one. The written decision of any two 
arbitrators shall be binding on each party. 
The cost of the arbitrator and any expert witness shall be 
paid by the party who hired them. The cost of the third 
arbitrator and other expenses of arbitration shall be shared 
equally by both parties. 
The arbitration shall take place in the county in which the 
insured resides unless the parties agree to another place. 
State court rules governing procedure and admission of 
evidence shall be used. 
We are not bound by any judgment against any person or 
organization obtained without our written consent. 
UNDERINSURED MOTOR VEHICLE 
COVERAGE W 
You have this coverage if vtW" appears in the "Coverages" 
space on the declarations page. 
We will pay damages for bodily injury an insured is legally 
entitled to collect from the owner or driver of an 
underinsured motor vehicle. The bodily injury must be caused 
by accident arising out of the operation, maintenance or use 
of an underinsured motor vehicle. 
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I MbK±, lb NU UJVfcKAGE UNTIL 
1 THE LIMITS OF LIABILITY OF ALL BODILY 
INJURY LIABILITY BONDS AND POLICIES 
THAT APPLY HAVE BEEN USED UP B\ 
PAYMENT OF JUDGMENTS OR 
SETTLEMENTS TO OTHER PERSONS; OR 
2. SUCH LIMITS OF LIABILITY OR REMAINING 
PART OF THEM HAVE BEEN OFFERED TO 
THE INSURED. 
Underinswed Motor Vehicle - means a land motor vehicle 
1. the ownership, maintenance or use of which is insured 
or bonded for bodily injury liability at the time of the 
accident, and 
2. whose limits of liability for bodily injury liability: 
a. are less than the amount of the insured's damages, 
or 
b. have been reduced by payments to persons other 
than the insured to less than the amount of the 
insured's damages. 
An underinsured motor vehicle does not include a land motor 
vehicle: 
1. insured under the liability coverage of this policy, 
2. furnished for the regular use of you, your spouse or any 
relative; 
3. owned by any government or any of its political 
subdivisions or agencies; 
4. designed for use mainly off public roads except while 
on public roads; 
5. tfhile located for use as premises; or 
6. defined as an "uninsured motor vehicle" in your policy 
Who Is an Insured 
Insured — means the person or persons covered by 
underinsured motor vehicle coverage: 
This is: 
L The first person mimed in the declarations; 
2. his or her spouse; 
3. their relatives; and 
4. any other person while occupying; 
a. your car, a temporary substitute car, a newly 
acquired car, or a trailer attached to such car. 
Such vehicle lias to be used within the scope of 
the consent of you or your spouse; or 
b a car not owned by you, your spouse or any 
relative, or a trailer attached to such a car. It 
has to be driven by the first person named in 
the declarations or that person's spouse and 
within the scope of the owner's consent 
Such other person occupying a vehicle used to carry 
persons for a charge is not an insured. 
5 an> person entitled to recover damages because of 
bodily injury to an insured under I through 4 above 
Deciding Fault and Amount 
Two questions must be deaded by agreement between the 
insured and us 
1 Is the insured legally entitled to collect damages 
from the owner or driver of the underinsured motor 
vehicle; and 
2 If so, in what amount9 
If there is no agreement, these questions shall be decided by 
arbitration upon written request of the insured or us 
Each party shall select a competent and impartial arbitrator 
These two shall select a third one. If unable to agree on the 
third one within 30 days either party may request a judge of 
a court of record in the county in which the arbitration ts 
pending to select a third one The written decision of any 
two arbitrators shall be binding on each party. 
The cost of the arbitrator and any expert witness shall be 
paid by the party who hired them The cost of the third 
arbitrator and other expenses of arbitration shall be shared 
equally by both parties. 
The arbitration shall take place in the county in which the 
insured resides unless the parties agree to another place. 
State court rules governing procedure and admission of 
evidence shall be used 
c 
We are not bound by any judgment against any person or 
organization obtained without our written consent 
Payment of Any Amount Due — Coverages U and W 
We will pay any amount due: 
1. to the insured; 
2. to a parent or guardian if the insured is a minor or 
an incompetent person; 
3. to the surviving spouse; or 
4. at our option, to a person authorized by law to 
receive such payment 
Limits of Liability - Coverage U 
1. The amount of coverage is shown on the declarations 
page under "Limits of Liability - U - Each Person, 
Each Accident". Under "Each Person" is the amount 
of coverage for all damages due to bodily injury to one 
person. "Bodily injury to one person" includes all injury 
and damages to others resulting from this bocSly injury. 
Under "Each Accident" is the total amount of 
coverage, subject to the amount shown under "Each 
Person", for all damages due to bodily injury to two or 




Any amount payable under this coverage shall be 
reduced by any amount paid or payable to or for the 
insured: 
a. by or for any person or organt/ation who is or may 
be held legally liable for the bodily injury to the 
insured; or 
b. for bodily injury under the liability coverage. 
Any payment made to a person under this coverage 
shall reduce any amount payable to that person under 
the bodily injury liability coverage. 
Any amount paid or payable under 
a. the no-fault coverage; or 
b. any worker's compensation, disability benefits, or 
similar law 
will not be paid for again as damages under this 
coverage. This does not reduce the limits of liability of 
this coverage. 
The limits of liability are not increased because: 
a. more than one vehicle is insured under this policy; 
or 
b. more than one person is insured at the time of the 
accident 
limits of Liability — Coverage W 
1. The amount of coverage is shown on the declarations 
page under "limits of Liability - W - Each Person, 
Each Accident". Under/'Each Person" is the amount 
of coverage for all damages due to bodily injury to onp 
person. Under "Each Accident" is the total amount of 
coverage; subject to the amount shown under "Each 
Person", for all damages due to bodily injury to two or 
more persons in the same accident 
2. Any amount paid or payable under 
a. the no-fault coverage; or 
b. any worker's compensation, disability benefits or 
similar law 
will not be paid for again as damages under this 
coverage. This does not reduce the limits of liability of 
this coverage. 
3. Any payment made to a person under this coverage 
shall reduce any amount payable to that person for 
bodily injury under the liability coverage. 
4. The limits of liability are not increased because: 
a more than one vehicle is insured under this policy; 
b. more than one person is insured at the time of the 
accident; or 
c. more than one underinswred motor vehicle is 
. involved in the same accident 
5. The most we pay will be the lesser of: 
a. the difference between the amount of the insured's 
damages for bodily injury, and the amount paid to 
the insured by or for any person or organization 
b. 
who is or may be held legally liable for the bodily 
injury; or 
the limits of liability of this coverage. 
When Coverage V Does Not Apply 
THERE IS NO COVERAGE: 
1. FOR ANY INSURED WHO, WITHOUT OUR 
WRITTEN CONSENT, SETTLES WITH ANY 
PERSON OR ORGANIZATION WHO MAY BE 
LIABLE FOR THE BODILY INJURY. 
2. FOR BODILYINJURYTO AN INSURED: 
a. WHILE OCCUPYING, OR 
b. THROUGH BEING STRUCK BY 
A MOTOR VEHICLE OWNED BY YOU, YOUR 
SPOUSE OR ANY RELATIVE IF IT IS NOT 
INSURED FOR THIS COVERAGE UNDER THIS 
POLICY. 
3. TO THE EXTENT IT BENEFITS: 
a. ANY WORKER'S COMPENSATION OR 
DISABILITY BENEFITS INSURANCE 
COMPANY. 
b. A SELF-INSURER UNDER ANY 
WORKER'S COMPENSATION, OR 
DISABILITY BENEFITS OR SIMILAR LAW. 
c. ANY GOVERNMENTAL BODY OR 
AGENCY. 
Wlien Coverage W Does Not Apply 
THERE IS NO COVERAGE: 
1. FOR ANY INSURED WHO, WITHOUT OUR 
WRITTEN CONSENT, SETTLES WITH ANY 
PERSON OR ORGANIZATION WHO MAY BE 
LIABLE FOR THE BODILY INJURY AND 
THEREBY IMPAIRS OUR RIGHT TO RECOVER 
OUR PAYMENTS. , 
FOR BODILY INJURYTO ANY INSURED: 
a. WHILE OCCUPYING, OR 
b. THROUGH BEING STRUCK BY 
A MOTOR VEHICLE OWNED BY YOU, YOUR 
SPOUSE OR ANY RELATIVE IF IT IS NOT 
INSURED FOR THIS COVERAGE UNDER THIS 
POLICY. 
TO THE EXTENT IT BENEFITS: 
a. ANY WORKER'S COMPENSATION OR 
DISABILITY BENEFITS INSURANCE 
COMPANY. 
b. A SELF-INSURER UNDER ANY 
WORKER'S COMPENSATION, OR 
DISABILITY BENEFITS OR SIMILAR LAW. 




4. FOR PUNITrVE DAMAGES OR IKTEREST 
AWARDED TO OR CLAIMED BY THE 
INSURED. 
If There Is Other Uninsured Motor Vehicle Coverage 
1. Regardless of the number of motor vehicles involved, 
the number of persons covered Or claims made, vehicles 
or premiums shown in the policy or premiums paid, the 
limit of liability for uninsured motor vehicle coverage 
shall not be added to or tacked upon limits for such n 
coverage applying to other motor vehicles to determine 
the amount of coverage available to an insured injured 
in any one accident. 
2. If the insured sustains bodily injury and other uninsured 
motor vehicle coverage applies: 
a. the insured must elect one policy under which to 
make a claim; and 
b. COVERAGE UNDER TfflS POLICY DOES 
NOT APPLY IF THE INSURED ELECTS ANY 
OTHER UNINSURED MOTOR VEHICLE 
COVERAGE. UNDER WHICH TO MAKE A 
CLAIM. 
3. THIS COVERAGE DOES NOT APPLY IF THERE 
IS OTHER UNINSURED MOTOR VEHICLE 
COVERAGE ON A NEWLY ACQUIRED CAR. 
If There Is Other Underinsured Motor Vehicle Coverage 
1. If the insured sustains bodily injury as a pedestrian and 
other underinsured motor vehicle coverage applies: 
a. the total limits of liability under all such coverages 4. 
shall not exceed that of the coverage with the 
highest limit of liability; and 
b we are bable only for our share. Our share is that 
per cent of the damages that the limit of liability of 
this coverage bears to the total of all underinsured 
motor vehicle coverage applicable to the accident. 
If the insured sustains bodily injury while occupying your 
car, and your car is described on the declarations page 
of another policy providing underinsured motor vehicle 
coverage: 
a. the total limits of liability under all such coverages 
shall not exceed that of the coverage with the 
highest limit of liability; and 
b. we are liable only for our share. Our share is that 
per cent of the damages that the limit of liability of 
this coverage bears to the total of all such 
underinsured motor vehicle coverage applicable to 
the accident 
3. If the insured sustains bodily injury while occupying a 
vehicle not owned by you, your spouse or any relative, 
this coverage applies: 
a. as excess to any underinsured motor vehicle 
coverage which applies to the vehicle as primary 
coverage, but 
b. only in the amount by which it exceeds the primary 
coverage. 
If coverage under more than one policy applies as 
excess: 
a. the total limit of liability shall not exceed-the 
difference between the limit of liability of the 
coverage that applies as primary and the highest 
limit of liability of any one of the coverages that 
apply as excess; and 
b. we are liable only for our share. Our share is that 
per cent of the damages that the limit of liability of 
this coverage bears to the total of all underinsured 
motor vehicle coverage applicable as excess to the 
accident. 
THIS COVERAGE DOES NOT APPLY IF THERE 
IS OTHER UNDERINSURED MOTOR VEHICLE 
COVERAGE ON A NEWLY ACQUIRED CAR. 
5. FOR ANY PERSON WHOSE CLAIM FOR 
BODILY INJURY ARISES OUT OF BODILY 2 
INJURY SUSTAINED BY ANOTHER PERSON. 
6. FOR COSTS OR ATTORNEY FEES INCURRED 
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implicitly denied. Is that correct? 
THE JUDGE: That was my intent. 
MR. EDWARDS: Okay. All right. Well, all 
right. That clears that up. Because that is not the way 
that I read that nor is it the way that I necessarily read 
the Court's findings. All right. Well, that... 
So then the issue then is let's talk about 
reasonableness and the reasonableness of what was, what was 
done in this case. We have— 
THE JUDGE: Well, before we get to that, Counsel, 
I think one of the reasons I... Counsel is correct. I gave 
56(f) permission to continue discovery because it was unclear 
if communication of that offer had ever been made. 
MR. EDWARDS: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
THE JUDGE: And that's, that's one of the 
principal things I expected the discovery to explore. Do 
you have additional evidence to present to me that in fact 
State Farm was ever given an opportunity to approve or not 
approve the offer to settle? 
MR. EDWARDS: All right. We have been hampered 
in being able to get that. It's true, we've taken ten 
depositions. 
THE JUDGE: Who would you need depose? 
MR. EDWARDS: We need to depose Mr. Ivie. We 
need to actually be able to have the Louder file placed 


























before Ms. Hirase so that she can understand. If you look 
at her deposition, and that's why we wanted to have the 
deposition published, we want to have... When asked about 
all of the questions about what was communicated and what was 
not communicated she said I don't remember, I don't remember 
anything, I don't recall a thing. You'll, you'll look at 
it, she could barely remember what her name was by the time 
of the end of the deposition. If you were to review the file 
would you be able to remember better? Obviously. They 
won't let us look at the file. In fact, we've got the 
representations today that that file was closed, it can't be 
opened. 
We would like to be able to have that file opened 
under whatever circumstances the Court believes would be 
appropriate. We don't want to invade on anybody's privilege, 
we don't want to— 
THE JUDGE: Well, you can't say I want to invade 
privilege but I don't want to invade privilege. What do you 
want me to do? It is privileged. 
MR. EDWARDS: Well, in that case perhaps we should 
wait until that case has been resolved before we get into 
that issue, we can wait until the Supreme Court has made a 
determination on that issue, on that case. At that point, I 
believe that we can get into that file without invading 
privilege and without undermining the case that is before the 



























THE JUDGE: But it's clear that if the, if there 
was a communication to Ms. Hirase it wasn't communicated to 
anyone else. 
MR. EDWARDS: That's not clear at all. That's 
not clear in this case at all. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. Who did she— 
MR. EDWARDS: It's not clear at all— 
THE JUDGE: Who did she communicate it to? Who 
did you depose? 
MR. EDWARDS: Well, as I stated they won't let us 
talk to Mr. Ivie either for many of the same reasons. 
THE JUDGE: Well, he's counsel. He doesn't have 
authority to approve it or not approve it. Who did, who did 
they communicate it to that, that could have taken action on 
it and given approval or not approval and thereby waive the 
privilege? 
MR. EDWARDS: We believe that it was communicated 
to, well, we don't know if it was communicated, we believe 
that it was probably communicated to Ms. Markham. But at 
least the issue— 
THE JUDGE: Well, you deposed her. Did you ask 
her about that? 
MR. EDWARDS: I don't know the answer to that, 
Your Honor. I didn't take that deposition. That's why we 


























wanted to publish the depositions. 
THE JUDGE: You haven't read the deposition? 
MR. EDWARDS: I have, I frankly have not, I have 
not reviewed it in depth. I believe that she was asked that 
and she said I don't, I don't recall. 
THE JUDGE: Well, Counsel (short inaudible, two 
speakers). 
MR. EDWARDS: We know that there, we know that 
there were communications between Ms. Hirase and Mr. Ivie and 
Ms. Markham. We know that. Jackson Howard has said I 
talked to Mr. Ivie, I talked to Ms. Hirase, I talked to 
Ms. Markham. We have the affidavit of Mr. Jackson that's 
been filed with the Court where he says now that I've had a 
chance to review their internal file I can state with some 
certitude that I did speak to, I think it was Ms. Markham in 
January about this issue, asked if she had completed the 
asset check. Obviously there was some communication there 
and that's noted in Ms. Markham's file as well. 
THE JUDGE: When did that communication take 
place? 
MR. EDWARDS: On January 4th, 1996. And he also 
states that he spoke to her again in February of 1996. 
THE JUDGE: And told her what? I'm sorry. 
MR. EDWARDS: Well there was, there was questions 
about the assets check. You know, he, the file simply notes 


























that there was conversation. He says, I talked about the 
assets check, I had been continually talking to her and to 
Mr. Ivie about the fact that we had this settlement on the 
table, we need to get the assets check done, we needed to do 
what we needed to do because my client needed the money. 
I guess then the big issue that we've got then is 
we, we would like to do more discovery in this case. The 
question... And it's been, it's been laid out in our— 
THE JUDGE: Specifically who do you want to, what 
discovery do you want to do? 
MR. EDWARDS: Well, it's been laid out here as to 
what it is that we'd like to do and what our schedule is as 
far as what it is that we think needs to be done. 
THE JUDGE: I mean, I'll be candid. I'm 
satisfied that if no offer was ever communicated to State 
Farm to give them an opportunity to approve or not approve 
that they're entitled to summary judgment. But I want to 
give you every opportunity to develop evidence to counter 
that allegation, every reasonable opportunity. I am 
concerned you've done a lot of discovery here but not focused 
on that issue. And that seems me to be the core issue 
here. That's what I intended when I allowed additional 
discovery. 
MR. EDWARDS: I understand, Your Honor. We've, 
we've done discovery. We don't have everything that we need 


























yet. We've laid it out from pages about 11 through oh, I 
don't know, we've got four or five pages of what we consider 
to be the steps that need to be taken in this case to have 
proper discovery done. We would ask that the Court allow us 
to do that. I mean, it's been laid out here as to what needs 
to be done. 
We'd like to have the files of the State Farm agent 
who sold the policies to Mrs. Green. We've requested that 
information. 
THE JUDGE: Why? How will that clear up what, 
the issue about communication of the offer? The agent that 
sold her the policy? How would that agent be involved in 
that at all? 
MR. EDWARDS: We'd like to see what kind of 
representations were made. There is an issue here of 
reasonableness as well, also of estoppel and of waiver in 
this case. And the issues of what were represented to the 
Greens at what time, what was represented to Mr. Howard by 
State Farm needs to be explored in this case. 
This is not simply an issue of did you receive 
written permission. If there is a long history in State Farm 
of giving oral permission we believe that that acts as a 
waiver and it is an estoppel. 
THE JUDGE: But there's no evidence that oral 
permission was ever given. I mean, it seems like you've got 


























to start there. 
MR. EDWARDS: We have Mr. Howard's evidence. 
THE JUDGE: And then if I get into evaluating 
whether the permission was, was satisfactory then we can talk 
about policy and practice and procedure. But so far there's 
no evidence that, that the communi... that the offer to 
settle was communicated to State Farm, that State Farm gave 
any kind of permission oral, written, or otherwise. 
MR. EDWARDS: We have Mr. Howard's evidence. And 
I believe that taking this case from the standpoint most 
advantageous to the party against whom summary judgment is 
sought— 
THE JUDGE: So you agree that you have 
Mr. Howard's statement that he called them when he had the 
check on his desk and received the statement do what you've 
got to do from some unknown caller. 
MR. EDWARDS: Well, he's not... He says in his 
affidavit I believe that it was Ms. Markham at this point. 
THE JUDGE: And you've deposed Ms. Markham and she 
says no, it wasn't me. 
MR. EDWARDS: She says I don't, I don't recall 
that that was me. I believe she does say that it was not 
her. 
THE JUDGE: Did you ask Mrs. Hirase if it was 
her? 
STATE FARM VS. GREEN NOV. 16, 2000 
MR. EDWARDS: Yes. And her response was I don't 
remember anything, I'd like to look at my file. And that 
file has not been produced to us. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. 
MR. EDWARDS: Where would you like me to go, Your 
Honor? 
THE JUDGE: Well, I'm inclined to direct 
Ms. Hirase to look at her file for the answer to that one 
question, if she was the person that took the call from 
Jackson Howard on February 15th and if she was the person who 
said do what you've got to do. 
MR. MORTENSEN: Your Honor, if I could save you 
some time, if we could have, either me bring it up to you and 
call that in chambers or— 
THE JUDGE: You've got the file? 
MR. GLAUSER: The file is here. 
MR. MORTENSEN: This won't constitute a waiver, we 
all understand that. 
THE JUDGE: I understand. It's not going to be, 
it's not going to be published. These are chronologic log 
notes, I take it. 
MR. MORTENSEN: It's just everything in the file 
(short inaudible, no mic). 
THE JUDGE: Well, I don't want to read the whole 
file. 


























MR. MORTENSEN: I believe the log notes are 
chronological. 
THE JUDGE: All I want, all I want to see is 
anything she's got related to February 15th. 
MR. MORTENSEN: (Short inaudible, no mic) December, 
January. 
THE JUDGE: Counsel, I'm looking at the claim 
activity logs. There are no entries for those time periods. 
There's an entry dated October 31st, the next entry is 
December 13th and then March 15th. There are no log entries 
whatsoever for that period of time. 
MR. EDWARDS: I'm not sure how to respond to that, 
Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: So I don't see the need of letting her 
look at that to refresh her recollection on something that 
happened in that period of time. 
MR. EDWARDS: I respectfully disagree. I believe 
that if we would, that if she were able to look over her... 
Looking over a log I'm not sure is going to, is 
necessarily.... I'd like her to look at her entire file. 
I believe that her, her memory could be refreshed as to what 
the course of dealings were between her and Mr., and Jackson 
Howard. I'm not sure that a simple quick look at a log that 
says I don't see anything is going to be dispositive of that 
issue. 


























THE JUDGE: Help me understand why she couldn't 
look at her, at her file while she's answering questions. 
What am I missing here? 
MR. GLAUSER: The Louder file is the privilege 
belongs to Louder. Hirase wasn't a UIM adjuster. 
THE JUDGE: Oh, I see. 
MR. GLAUSER: She was the Louder adjuster. 
THE JUDGE: I see. 
MR. GLAUSER: And in fact, in Jackson Howard's 
deposition he specifically said that Joanne Hirase told him, 
this is on page 121. 
"Question: Did Joanne Hirase ever try, 
based on your knowledge and what you 
heard and saw, ever try to address the 
UIM claim? 
Answer: No. Her general argument was it 
belonged to somebody else, that was not 
her job. 
Question. That would be Ms. Markham? 
Answer: I think that's who it was, yes." 
THE JUDGE: And that's Jackson Howard? 
MR. GLAUSER: That's Jackson Howard. And in 
fact, earlier in this he said that Phil said the same thing. 
I mean, he knew Bonnie Markham was the one handling this. 
THE JUDGE: What's your take on that? 


























MR. EDWARDS: Well, my take on that is that I'd 
like to have it all come out. To simply say well, you have 
over here— 
THE JUDGE: Well, you're relying on Jackson 
Howard. Right? 
MR. EDWARDS: What's that? 
THE JUDGE: You're relying on Jackson Howard? 
MR. EDWARDS: Well, yes. But as you can see he 
did not have, he didn't have access to the, to the notes, he 
didn't have access to the file. He only, he had his 
understanding of what was, what was going on. His 
understanding was not necessarily complete. He didn't know 
what was going on behind the scenes. He only stood, 
understood what he was being told. So to simply say well, 
we're going to rely on what Jackson Howard might have 
understood may not be dispositive in this case. 
We have a situation in which you have a Louder file 
over here on one side of the room and you have the UIM on the 
other side of the room. State Farm would have us believe 
that never the twain ever met. But that's not true at 
all. We have Markham over here, we have Hirase over here, 
we had them speaking to each other, we have a meeting between 
them and Mr. Ivie as well, we have discussions back and forth 
between the two. In fact, we have Mr. Ivie who's 
representing Mr. Louder in this case doing an assets check on 
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Oram Claim Office 
160 East 1300 South 
November 6, 1995 %Z££2£ 
Kenneth Parkinson 
Attorney at Law 
P. O. Box 778 
Provo, UT 84603 
RE: Our Claim No: 44-0953-974 
Our Insured: Tim Green Y/Client: Lora Green 
Date of Loss: July 13, 1995 
Dear Mr. Parkinson: 
This will acknowledge receipt of a copy of the information you 
provided Joanne Hirase on Lora Green. When you and I discussed 
this case, you indicated Ms. Green would be in this area in the 
near future and agreed to set up a meeting where we could meet 
with her and obtain her version of this accident. 
You have indicated that the insurance on the Murray vehicle has a 
25/50 liability limit. I will need verification of those limits 
and the offer to extend the limits before I can consider any 
claim under the Underinsured coverage available under Ms. Green's 
own policy. Please keep in mind that before we can authorize Ms. 
Green to sign any releases, we will need to conduct an assets 
check on Marlene Murray. Once the results of the check are 
received, I will let you know if you can proceed with settlement 
with the primary carrier. Please keep in mind that the statute 
of limitations on this claim will run on 7 13 98. 
I look forward to meeting with you and your client when she is in 
the area. 
Sincerely, 
Bonnie Karkham WA % , f 
Claim Specialist - * fe^ 
(801) 222-3203 
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company 
1 Q ^ 
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HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW 
120 East 300 North Street RECEfV""" ' ' 
Post Office Box 778 
Jackson Howard Provo, Utah 84603 . , * * 4 , ., , -% Richard W. Dayncs 
Don R. Petersen *'-* ! ' - ^ w Phillip E. Lowry 
Craig M. Snyder Telephone: (801) 373-6345 Kenneth Parkinson 
John L. Valentine Faciimile: (801) 377-4991 UhU4 * « " * wa«u F. Richards Smith III 
D. David Lambert 
Leslie W. Slaugh R,d No* 2 3 ' 3 1 2 OF COUNSEL 
S. Rex Lewis 
March 7, 1996 
Bonnie Markham, Adjuster 
State Farm Insurance Company 
160 East 1300 South 
Orem, Utah 84058-7686 
RE: Your Insured: Lora Green 
Claim #: 953-974 
DOL: July 13, 1995 
Dear Ms. Markham: 
This office has been retained by Mrs. Lora Green who was injured in an automobile 
accident on July 13, 1995, in Provo, Utah. Mrs. Green was a passenger in a vehicle driven by 
her mother, Marlene Murray. The collision occurred when the two vehicles crossed the center 
yellow line causing a head-on collision. Mrs. Green was seriously injured in the accident and 
has sustained continuing and debilitating injuries from that date to the present. 
We have evaluated her case and determined that the fault of the accident was that of 
Lloyd Louder and her mother, Marlene Murray, and that her damages far exceed the limits of 
the insurance policies of Mr. Louder and Mrs. Murray, as well as her insurance coverage with 
State Farm Insurance. We have made a settlement demand from Mr. Louder's insurance 
company for the policy limits of $50,000.00. We have settled for the policy limits of Ms. 
Murray's insurance carrier for $25,000.00. Attached is a copy of the settlement demand package 
that was sent to Mr. Louder's carrier. 
Inasmuch as Mrs. Green's damages far exceed the available insurance policy limits of 
Mr. Louder, Mrs. Murray, and her own insurance, after some discussion with Mrs. Green, she 
has authorized that we request a settlement from you for the policy limits of her underinsured 
policy coverage, which I am advised is the sum of $100,00.00. We respectfully demand payment 
of the underinsured limits in the amount of $100,00.00, contingent upon your confirming to us 
the limits of the policy. 
192.3 
March 7, 1996 
Page 2 
This letter is solely intended as a settlement offer and as much is not evidentiary in 
nature. Would you please respond to this request within 10 days from the date of this letter. 
Your prompt consideration of this matter is most appreciated. 
Respectfully, 
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JACKSON HOWARD (1548), for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW 
120 East 300 North Street 
P.O. Box 778 Our File No. 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Telephone: (801) 373-6345 
Facsimile: (801) 377-4991 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 








Case No. 960400412 
Judge Anthony W. Schofield 
COMES NOW the plaintiff and complains of the defendant and for cause of action 
alleges: 
1. Plaintiff is a resident of Twin PeaJcs, California. 
2. Defendant is a foreign corporation qualified to do business in the State of Utah. 
3. Plaintiff is an insured of State Farm Insurance Company under two policies. 
The declaration pages, outlining the basics of each policy is attached hereto and made a part 
hereof as Exhibits A and B. 
4. This Court has jurisdiction over the persons and subject matter of this action 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 78-3-4(1) (1993 as Amended). 
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5. Venue is properly laid with this Court in accordance with the statutory mandate 
contained in Utah Code Annotated 78-13-4 (1990 as Amended). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
6. Plaintiff was a passenger in a vehicle driven by her mother Marlene Murray 
when a collision occurred involving the Murray vehicle and an automobile driven by Lloyd 
Louder, also an insured of State Farm Insurance Company. There is attached hereto as Exhibit 
C and made a part hereof the declaration page of the automobile policy issued by the Defendant 
to Lloyd Louder. 
7. The accident described above occurred on July 13, 1995, on U.S. 89 in Provo 
Canyon, Utah County, State of Utah. 
8. Plaintiff received severe and grievous injuries and has sustained damages which 
she believes to be in the oxctss of $500,000.00. To the date of this Complaint, Plaintiff has 
incurred hospital expenses, medical expense, and general damages totalling $131,028.28. 
9. The insurance policy issued by Horace Mann Insurance Companies to Marlene 
Murray on her vehicle involved the collision described above contained a liability coverage of 
only Twenty-Five Thousand Dollars ($25,000.00). 
10. The Plaintiff and persons acting on her behalf immediately notified the agents 
and employees of the Defendant of the collision and the magnitude of the Plaintiffs injuries. 
Further the Plaintiff and persons acting on her behalf made claim for the benefits under the 
2 
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Plaintiffs policy with the Defendant which included wno-fault" and "underinsured" as well as 
other itemized benefits under the policy. 
11. Defendant, at all times relevant hereto, knew of the limited amount of liability 
coverage contained in the Horace Mann Insurance Company policy on the vehicle of Marlene 
Murray, and knew Plaintiff was in desperate need of money to meet the losses and costs 
associated with her injury. The Defendant, at all times relevant hereto, knew that the Plaintiffs 
agents were negotiating with the representatives of Horace Mann to settle for the Twenty-Five 
Thousand Dollars ($25,000.00), which represented the policy limits of Horace Mann policy. 
12. Contemporaneously with the negotiations with Horace Mann for the limits of 
that policy, the Plaintiffs agents were negotiating with the Defendant State Farm Insurance 
Company to received underinsured motorist coverage under the two policies attached hereto as 
Exhibits A and B and to receive the other benefits of the policies issued by the Defendant. 
13. In addition to the notification sent directly to the Defendant, State Farm 
Insurance Company was advised of the claim of the Plaintiff by a lawsuit filed by the Plaintiff 
against State Farm's insured, Lloyd Louder, on the 9th day of October, 1995, in the Fourth 
Judicial District Court in and for Utah County, State of Utah, as Case No. 950400617. 
14. Despite the notification provided to the Defendant concerning the Plaintiffs 
claims under the policies, the extent of the Plaintiffs injuries and the monetary demands placed 
on the Plaintiff by the accident, State Farm failed to undertake a timely and proper investigation 
of the substance of the Plaintiffs claims and act reasonably in relation thereto. 
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15. Specifically, knowing that the Plaintiff intended to settle with Horace Mann 
Insurance Company for the policy limits of the Murray policy, the Defendant failed and refused 
to negotiate with the Plaintiff in good faith to settle her underinsured and other claims under the 
policies issued by the Plaintiffs. The Defendant's action in failing to resolve the Plaintiffs 
claims was with full knowledge of the Plaintiffs loss of income, the mounting medical and 
related expenses associated with the accident and the other pressing needs of the Plaintiff. 
16. Further, the Defendant's misconduct was accentuated by its obvious conflict of 
interest in negotiating with the Plaintiff on behalf of the other driver, Louder, who was also a 
State Farm insured. 
17. Defendant employed the law firm of Ivie & Young to represent Louder and has 
control over the management of that litigation and has control over the settlement of that case. 
Plaintiff has offered to settle her claim against Louder for the insurance coverage available to 
Louder. Defendant has refused that offer. 
18. Plaintiff has offered to settle claims against Defendant for the underinsured 
motorist coverage under policies A and B to this Complaint, and Defendant has refused to pay 
said sums, and has, in fact, contrary to its duties to the Plaintiff, engaged in nefarious conduct 
claiming that the Plaintiff breached the terms of her underinsured motorist contract by settling 
with her mother, (Mrs. Murray's insurance company, Horace Mann), for the $25,000.00 
coverage available to her mother, and further, has refused to pay said sum under the guise that 
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it is "investigating the matter," and has further set up frivolous defenses such as a deprivation 
of its right to go against Mrs. Murray. 
19. When the plaintiff was forced to initiate suit against the State Farm insured, 
Lloyd Louder, the Plaintiff named her mother, Mrs. Murray only for purposes of meeting the 
legal requirement that the conduct or negligence of all parties be compared. The Plaintiff never 
served Mrs. Murray or required her appearance in the action against Lloyd Louder. The 
Defendant, State Farm, however, on behalf of its insured, Louder, file a claim against Mrs. 
Murray, by way of a cross-claim, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit D ad made a 
part hereof. This the Defendant did when it knew that Mrs. Murray was unable to economically 
respond to the claims of her daughter, Lora Green, at a time when it knew that her daughter, 
for familial reasons, was unwilling to sue her mother in order to benefit State Farm Insurance 
Company, and further, when it knew that even if all of Mrs. Murra} 's asset were applied to the 
damages of the Plaintiff, her daughter, that State Farm would still be liable for an amount in 
txctss of the insurance available under the underinsured motorist policy. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Bad Faith-Utah Policies) 
20. The Plaintiff incorporates the provisions of paragraphs 1 through 19 above. 
21. Defendant's conduct in this case has been willful, malicious and constitutes a 
breach of its fiduciary duty to the Plaintiff. 
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22. Plaintiff is entitled to judgment against the Defendant for the insurance coverage 
available under the policies referred to in Exhibits A and B and to the Louder policy, Exhibit 
C. 
23. Plaintiff is further entitled to judgment against the Defendant for damages as 
may be established upon proof at trial together with costs and attorney fees reasonably incurred 
by the Plaintiff as allowed by law. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Bad Faith—California Policy) 
24. The Plaintiff incorporates the provisions of paragraphs 1 through 23 above. 
25. Defendants' conduct in this case has been willful, malicious and constitutes a 
breach of its fiduciary duty to the Plaintiff. 
26. Plaintiff is entitled to an application of California's substantive law in 
interpreting the policy of insurance issued by the Defendant in California. Under California law, 
the Plaintiff is entitled to judgment against the Defendant for the insurance coverage available 
under the California policy. 
27. Plaintiff is further entitled to judgment against the Defendant for damages as 
may be established upon proof at trial together with costs and attorney fees as allowed by law. 
28. Further, under California law, the Plaintiff is entitled to punitive damages in 
an amount that will adequately and properly punish the Defendant for its wrongful conduct and 
serve as a wholesome reminder to other insurance companies not to do likewise. 
6 
16Ju 
29. Plaintiff is further entitled to judgment against the Defendant for damages as 
may be established upon proof at trial together with reasonably incurred costs and attorney foes 
as allowed by law. 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Breach of Fiduciary and Fair Dealing Duties) 
30. The Plaintiff incorporates the provisions of paragraphs 1 through 29 above. 
31. Defendant's conduct in this case has been willful, malicious and constitutes a 
breach of its fiduciary duty and its duty to deal in good faith with the Plaintiff and her 
representatives. 
32. Plaintiff is entitled to judgment against the Defendant for the insurance coverage 
available under the policies issued to the Plaintiff by the Defendant. 
33. Plaintiff is further entitled to judgment against the Defendant for damages as 
may be established upon proof at trial together with costs and attorney fees reasonably incurred 
by the Plaintiff as allowed by law. 
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress) 
34. The Plaintiff incorporates the provisions of paragraphs 1 through 33 above. 
35. The Defendant engaged in misconduct, which the Defendant knew or should 
have known was likely to cause severe emotional distress to the Plaintiff. 
36. As a result of the Defendant's misconduct, the plaintiff has sustained damage 
and injury for which she is entitled to recover upon proof at trial. 
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FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress) 
37. The Plaintiff incorporates the provisions of paragraphs 1 through 36 above. 
38. The Defendant engaged in misconduct, constituting negligent infliction of 
emotional distress which has resulted in serious injury and damage to the Plaintiff. 
39. As a result of the Defendant's misconduct, the plaintiff has sustained damage 
and injury for which she is entitled to recover upon proof at trial. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays judgment against the Defendant as follows: 
1. For the benefits of the policies issued by the Defendant to the Plaintiff in Utah 
and California. 
2. For such damages as may be established upon proof at trial to compensate the 
Plaintiff for her injury and damage together with prejudgment interest as allowed by law. 
3. For punitive damages. 
4. For attorney fees and costs of this action. 
5. For such other relief as may be just and proper under these premises. 
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DATED this 2. g> day of October, 1996. 
'fijVmsAsbO*/ 
/ J A C K S O N H O W A R D , for: 
^HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Plaintiffs Address: 
P.O. Box 371 
Twin Peaks, California 92391 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to ths 
following, postage prepaid, this _j2Z_"aay of October, 1996. 
Richard K. Glauser, Esq. 
Hanson, Epperson & Smith 
4 Triad Center, Suite 500 
P.O. Box 2970 





Relevant Time Line 
DATE DESCRIPTION 
7/13/95 Auto accident. 
8/1/95 Letter of representation with incorrect policy number. See Exhibit 
3. 
9/5/95 Letter with cover sheet from Green's attorney dated 8/31/95 
received by State Farm with the correct policy number. 
9/27/95 UIM file assigned to Bonnie Markham. See Exhibit 5. 
9/27/95 Bonnie Markham calls Green's attorney on first-day file assigned to 
her, but has to leave message. See Exhibit 5. 
9/27/95 On first-day file assigned to Bonnie Markham, attempts to gather 
facts. See Exhibit 5. 
10/3/95 Bonnie Markham again attempts to call Green's attorney and 
leaves message. See Exhibit 5. 
10/5/95 Green's attorney finally calls Bonnie Markham with some verbal 
information. See Exhibit 5. 
10/5/95 Bonnie Markham called Murray's carrier. No answer. See Exhibit 
5. 
10/5/95 Bonnie Markham obtained police report from Hirase, claim rep on 
Louder. See Exhibit 5. 
10/9/95 Green authorizes a sharing of information between State 
Farm/Green file and State Farm/Louder file. See Exhibit 5; See 
Exhibit 6. 
10/9/95 Green tells Bonnie Markham that Murray has a $25,000 policy. 
However, at this time there are no medical records, medical bills or 
policy confirmation in writing. See Exhibit 5. 
10/9/95 Letter from Horace Mann to Jackson Howard stating that the 
Personal Injury Protection form, medical reports, records and 
billings have not been received. See Exhibit 6. 
14. 10/20/95 
15. 
Letter from Green to Horace Mann responding to 10-9-95 letter 
providing limited medical bills in the amount of $3,270.00 and a 
completed Personal Injury Protection form signed by Green on 
10/9/95. See Exhibit 7. 
10/31/95 Bonnie Markham meets with superintendent, Ivie and Hirase. 
Louder has been served. Ivie will get asset checks. Negligence 











Letter sent by State Farm/Green (i.e., Bonnie Markham) to 
Green's attorney. This letter reminds Green of its duty not to 
settle without permission and requests notification and 
documentation of any offer of settlement with verification of 
policy limits. See Exhibit 16. 
John Sacks responds in writing to Bonnie Markham's report telling 
her to coordinate with Hirase when payments and limits occur, but 
not investigation. Sacks instructs Markham to update key areas 
with current information. He instructs Markham to report back on 
January 8, 1996. See Exhibit 16. 
Horace Mann offers policy limits of $25,000 to Green. See 
Exhibit 9, p. F; Exhibit 10, p.2. 
Green's attorney calls Horace Mann. Wants to wait a couple of 
weeks. He will call adjustor. See Exhibit 9; p. F, Exhibit 10, p. 2. 
Green's attorney calls Horace Mann and accepts the policy 
limits offer of $25,000. See Exhibit 9, p. F, Exhibit 10, p. 2. 
Horace Mann sends a letter with a check for $25,000 and a release 
confirming the oral agreement of settlement on 1/26/96. See 
Exhibit 9, pp. 13, 15 and 18. 
3lt is extremely important to note that this meeting occurs ten days prior to November 
10, 1995, when the offer for policy limits of $25,000.00 is first made by Horace Mann to 




2/1/96 Green's attorney sends fax to Horace Mann requesting a change in 
the release to "Protect us against claims from the other insurance 
companies which your release discharges." See Exhibit 9, pp. 10, 
11, 12, 16and17. 
2/16/96 Lora Green signs release. See Exhibit 9, p. 7-8. 
2/27/96 Green's attorney returns to Horace Mann the signed and notarized 
Release of All Claims against Marlene Murray. See Exhibit 9, p. 6. 
3/7/96 Green's attorney makes a demand on her UIM insurance for the 
first time and includes a settlement brochure. The demand is in 
the amount of $100,000. The letter states, "We have settled for 
the policy limits of Ms. Murray's insurance carrier for $25,000." 
Absolutely no mention that Green had been given permission 
to settle from State Farm. See Exhibit 11. 
3/11/96 State Farm/Green receives the March 7th letter indicating he has 
already settled the claim for $25,000. Bonnie Markham makes a 
log note indicating, "He indicates he has already settled the 
claim with primary carrier for $25,000 which would be a 
violation of policy". See Exhibit 5. 
4/6/96 Green's attorney's letter to State Farm responding to State Farm's 
March 15 letter. Green's attorney states, "You knew that we were 
dealing with all three companies at the time. You made no claim 
you wanted to participate in the settlement with Horace Mann 
Insurance Company". No mention is made that Green informed 
State Farm of the Horace Mann policy offer. See Exhibit 17. 
4/24/96 Letter from Green's attorney to State Farm. Letter discusses State 
Farm's duties. Again, no mention is made that Green notified 
State Farm of the Horace Mann policy limits offer prior to 
settlement or that permission to settle was requested. See 
Exhibit 18. 
5/30/96 Letter from Jackson Howard to State Farm indicating that "I intend 
to file in the next ten days unless you proffer the entire coverage of 
the underinsured motorists policy". See Exhibit 13. 
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30. 5/30/96 Green's attorney files a bad-faith complaint. (The complaint 
makes no allegation that Green notified State Farm of the 
Horace Mann offer with policy limits. The complaint makes no 
allegation that State Farm was aware that a policy limit offer 
had been made.) See Exhibit 14, Bad-Faith Complaint. 
31. 7/1/96 State Farm files a declaratory relief action claiming breach of 
contract for failure to notify State Farm of the Horace Mann policy 
limits offer and failure to obtain permission to settle. See 
Complaint. 
32. 10/30/96 Green files an amended complaint. Again, Green, even though 
setting out a specific "statement of facts" at no time alleges that 
Green informed State Farm that Horace Mann had made a 
$25,000 policy limits offer. See Exhibit 15, pp. 2-19. Defendant 
raises in this bad-faith action that "State Farm failed to undertake a 
timely and proper investigation . .." See Exhibit 15, p. 3, U 14. 
33. 4/19/99 State Farm files its Motion for Protective Order. 
34. 11/1/99 The Court hears State Farm's Motion for Summary Judgment 
denying such motion and allowing Green to obtain additional 
discovery for the purpose of showing notice to State Farm. Green 
proceeds to obtain UIM file and to depose nine adjustors in two 
states. Green fails to produce facts showing that State Farm 
had notice of the policy limits offer from Horace Mann prior to 
settlement. 
Green inappropriately focuses on the "duties to investigate" regarding an insurance 
company. Green goes to the trouble to list a time chart in an attempt to show that the 
duties to investigate were not done appropriately. Green confuses the issues of her own 
duty under the contract to inform, notify and request permission from State Farm to settle 
with her mother, Murray, before she forever releases her. State Farm did a proper 
-13-
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31A-22-305. Uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage. 
(1) As used in this section, "covered persons11 includes: 
(a) the named insured; 
(b) persons related to the named insured by blood, marriage, adoption, or guardianship, who 
are residents of the named insured's household, including those who usually make their home in 
the same household but temporarily live elsewhere; 
(c) any person occupying or using a motor vehicle referred to in the policy or owned by a 
self-insurer; and 
(d) any person who is entitled to recover damages against the owner or operator of the 
uninsured or underinsured motor vehicle because of bodily injury to or death of persons under 
Subsection (l)(a), (b), or (c). 
(2) As used in this section, "uninsured motor vehicle" includes: 
(a) (i) a vehicle, the operation, maintenance, or use of which is not covered under a liability 
policy at the time of an injury-causing occurrence; or 
(ii) (A) a vehicle covered with lower liability limits than required by Section 31A-22-304; 
(B) the vehicle described in Subsection (2)(a)(ii)(A) is uninsured to the extent of the 
deficiency; 
(b) an unidentified vehicle that left the scene of an accident proximately caused by the 
vehicle operator; 
(c) a vehicle covered by a liability policy, but coverage for an accident is disputed by the 
liability insurer for more than 60 days or, beginning with the effective date of this act, continues 
to be disputed for more than 60 days; or 
(d) (i) an insured vehicle if, before or after the accident, the liability insurer of the vehicle is 
declared insolvent by a court of competent jurisdiction; 
(ii) the vehicle described in Subsection (2)(d)(i) is uninsured only to the extent that the claim 
against the insolvent insurer is not paid by a guaranty association or fund. 
(3) (a) Uninsured motorist coverage under Subsection 31A-22-302(l)(b) provides coverage 
for covered persons who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of 
uninsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury, sickness, disease, or death. 
(b) For new policies written on or after January 1, 2001, the limits of uninsured motorist 
coverage shall be equal to the lesser of the limits of the insured's motor vehicle liability coverage 
or the maximum uninsured motorist coverage limits available by the insurer under the insured's 
motor vehicle policy, unless the insured purchases coverage in a lesser amount by signing an 
acknowledgment form provided by the insurer that: 
(i) waives the higher coverage; 
(ii) reasonably explains the purpose of uninsured motorist coverage; and 
(iii) discloses the additional premiums required to purchase uninsured motorist coverage with 
limits equal to the lesser of the limits of the insured's motor vehicle liability coverage or the 
maximum uninsured motorist coverage limits available by the insurer under the insured's motor 
vehicle policy. 
(c) Uninsured motorist coverage may not be sold with limits that are less than the minimum 
bodily injury limits for motor vehicle liability policies under Section 31A-22-304. 
(d) The acknowledgment under Subsection (3)(b) continues for that issuer of the uninsured 
motorist coverage until the insured, in writing, requests different uninsured motorist coverage 
from the insurer. 
(e) (i) In conjunction with the first two renewal notices sent after January 1, 2001, for policies 
existing on that date, the insurer shall disclose in the same medium as the premium renewal 
notice, an explanation of the purpose of uninsured motorist coverage and the costs associated 
with increasing the coverage in amounts up to and including the maximum amount available by 
the insurer under the insured's motor vehicle policy. 
(ii) The disclosure shall be sent to all insureds that carry uninsured motorist coverage limits 
in an amount less than the insured's motor vehicle liability policy limits or the maximum 
uninsured motorist coverage limits available by the insurer under the insured's motor vehicle 
policy. 
(4) (a) (i) Except as provided in Subsection (4)(b), the named insured may reject uninsured 
motorist coverage by an express writing to the insurer that provides liability coverage under 
Subsection 31A-22-302(l)(a). 
(ii) This rejection shall be on a form provided by the insurer that includes a reasonable 
explanation of the purpose of uninsured motorist coverage. 
(iii) This rejection continues for that issuer of the liability coverage until the insured in 
writing requests uninsured motorist coverage from that liability insurer. 
(b) (i) All persons, including governmental entities, that are engaged in the business of, or 
that accept payment for, transporting natural persons by motor vehicle, and all school districts 
that provide transportation services for their students, shall provide coverage for all vehicles used 
for that purpose, by purchase of a policy of insurance or by self-insurance, uninsured motorist 
coverage of at least $25,000 per person and $500,000 per accident. 
(ii) This coverage is secondary to any other insurance covering an injured covered person. 
(c) Uninsured motorist coverage: 
(i) is secondary to the benefits provided by Title 34A, Chapter 2, Workers' Compensation 
Act; 
(ii) may not be subrogated by the Workers' Compensation insurance carrier; 
(iii) may not be reduced by any benefits provided by Workers' Compensation insurance; and 
(iv) may be reduced by health insurance subrogation only after the covered person has been 
made whole. 
(d) As used in this Subsection (4): 
(i) "Governmental entity" has the same meaning as under Section 63-30-2. 
(ii) "Motor vehicle" has the same meaning as under Section 41-la-102. 
(5) When a covered person alleges that an uninsured motor vehicle under Subsection (2)(b) 
proximately caused an accident without touching the covered person or the vehicle occupied by 
the covered person, the covered person must show the existence of the uninsured motor vehicle 
by clear and convincing evidence consisting of more than the covered person's testimony. 
(6) (a) The limit of liability for uninsured motorist coverage for two or more motor vehicles 
may not be added together, combined, or stacked to determine the limit of insurance coverage 
available to an injured person for any one accident. 
(b) (i) Subsection (6)(a) applies to all persons except a covered person as defined under 
Subsection (7)(b)(ii). 
(ii) A covered person as defined under Subsection (7)(b)(ii) is entitled to the highest limits of 
uninsured motorist coverage afforded for any one vehicle that the covered person is the named 
insured or an insured family member. 
(iii) This coverage shall be in addition to the coverage on the vehicle the covered person is 
occupying. 
(iv) Neither the primary nor the secondary coverage may be set off against the other. 
(c) Coverage on a motor vehicle occupied at the time of an accident shall be primary 
coverage, and the coverage elected by a person described under Subsections (l)(a) and (b) shall 
be secondary coverage. 
(7) (a) Uninsured motorist coverage under this section applies to bodily injury, sickness, 
disease, or death of covered persons while occupying or using a motor vehicle only if the motor 
vehicle is described in the policy under which a claim is made, or if the motor vehicle is a newly 
acquired or replacement vehicle covered under the terms of the policy. Except as provided in 
Subsection (6) or (7), a covered person injured in a vehicle described in a policy that includes 
uninsured motorist benefits may not elect to collect uninsured motorist coverage benefits from 
any other motor vehicle insurance policy under which he is a covered person. 
(b) Each of the following persons may also recover uninsured motorist benefits under any 
other policy in which they are described as a "covered person" as defined in Subsection (1): 
(i) a covered person injured as a pedestrian by an uninsured motor vehicle; and 
(ii) a covered person injured while occupying or using a motor vehicle that is not owned by, 
furnished, or available for the regular use of the covered person, the covered person's resident 
spouse, or the covered person's resident relative. 
(c) A covered person in Subsection (7)(b) is not barred against making subsequent elections 
if recovery is unavailable under previous elections. 
(8) (a) As used in this section, "underinsured motor vehicle" includes a vehicle, the 
operation, maintenance, or use of which is covered under a liability policy at the time of an 
injury-causing occurrence, but which has insufficient liability coverage to compensate fully the 
injured party for all special and general damages. 
(b) The term "underinsured motor vehicle" does not include: 
(i) a motor vehicle that is covered under the liability coverage of the same policy that also 
contains the underinsured motorist coverage; or 
(ii) an uninsured motor vehicle as defined in Subsection (2). 
(9) (a) Underinsured motorist coverage under Subsection 31A-22-302(l)(c) provides 
coverage for covered persons who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or 
operators of underinsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury, sickness, disease, or death. 
(b) For new policies written on or after January 1, 2001, the limits of underinsured motorist 
coverage shall be equal to the lesser of the limits of the insured's motor vehicle liability coverage 
or the maximum underinsured motorist coverage limits available by the insurer under the 
insured's motor vehicle policy, unless the insured purchases coverage in a lesser amount by 
signing an acknowledgment form provided by the insurer that: 
(i) waives the higher coverage; 
(ii) reasonably explains the purpose of underinsured motorist coverage; and 
(iii) discloses the additional premiums required to purchase underinsured motorist coverage 
with limits equal to the lesser of the limits of the insured's motor vehicle liability coverage or the 
maximum underinsured motorist coverage limits available by the insurer under the insured's 
motor vehicle policy. 
(c) Underinsured motorist coverage may not be sold with limits that are less than $10,000 for 
one person in any one accident and at least $20,000 for two or more persons in any one accident. 
(d) The acknowledgment under Subsection (9)(b) continues for that issuer of the 
underinsured motorist coverage until the insured, in writing, requests different underinsured 
motorist coverage from the insurer. 
(e) The named insured's underinsured motorist coverage, as described in Subsection (9)(a), is 
secondary to the liability coverage of an owner or operator of an underinsured motor vehicle, as 
described in Subsection (8). Underinsured motorist coverage may not be set off against the 
liability coverage of the owner or operator of an underinsured motor vehicle, but shall be added 
to, combined with, or stacked upon the liability coverage of the owner or operator of the 
underinsured motor vehicle to determine the limit of coverage available to the injured person. 
(f) (i) A named insured may reject underinsured motorist coverage by an express writing to 
the insurer that provides liability coverage under Subsection 31A-22-302(l)(a). 
(ii) This written rejection shall be on a form provided by the insurer that includes a 
reasonable explanation of the purpose of underinsured motorist coverage and when it would be 
applicable. 
(iii) This rejection continues for that issuer of the liability coverage until the insured in 
writing requests underinsured motorist coverage from that liability insurer. 
(g) (i) In conjunction with the first two renewal notices sent after January 1, 2001, for 
policies existing on that date, the insurer shall disclose in the same medium as the premium 
renewal notice, an explanation of the purpose of underinsured motorist coverage and the costs 
associated with increasing the coverage in amounts up to and including the maximum amount 
available by the insurer under the insured's motor vehicle policy. 
(ii) The disclosure shall be sent to all insureds that carry underinsured motorist coverage 
limits in an amount less than the insured's motor vehicle liability policy limits or the maximum 
underinsured motorist coverage limits available by the insurer under the insured's motor vehicle 
policy. 
(10) (a) Underinsured motorist coverage under this section applies to bodily injury, sickness, 
disease, or death of an insured while occupying or using a motor vehicle owned by, furnished, or 
available for the regular use of the insured, a resident spouse, or resident relative of the insured, 
only if the motor vehicle is described in the policy under which a claim is made, or if the motor 
vehicle is a newly acquired or replacement vehicle covered under the terms of the policy. Except 
as provided in this Subsection (10), a covered person injured in a vehicle described in a policy 
that includes underinsured motorist benefits may not elect to collect underinsured motorist 
coverage benefits from any other motor vehicle insurance policy under which he is a named 
insured. 
(b) (i) The limit of liability for underinsured motorist coverage for two or more motor 
vehicles may not be added together, combined, or stacked to determine the limit of insurance 
coverage available to an injured person for any one accident. 
(ii) Subsection (10)(b)(i) applies to all persons except a covered person as defined under 
Subsection (10)(d)(i)(B). 
(iii) Coverage on a motor vehicle occupied at the time of an accident shall be primary 
coverage, and the coverage elected by a person described under Subsections (l)(a) and (b) shall 
be secondary coverage. 
(c) Underinsured motorist coverage: 
(i) is secondary to the benefits provided by Title 34A, Chapter 2, Workers' Compensation 
Act; 
(ii) may not be subrograted by the Workers' Compensation insurance carrier; 
(iii) may not be reduced by any benefits provided by Workers' Compensation insurance; and 
(iv) may be reduced by health insurance subrogation only after the covered person has been 
made whole. 
(d) (i) Each of the following persons may also recover underinsured motorist coverage 
benefits under any other policy in which they are described as a "covered person" as defined 
under Subsection (1): 
(A) a covered person injured as a pedestrian by an underinsured motor vehicle; or 
(B) a covered person injured while occupying or using a motor vehicle that is not owned by, 
furnished, or available for the regular use of the covered person, the covered person's resident 
spouse, or the covered person's resident relative. 
(ii) This coverage shall only be available as a secondary source of coverage. 
(iii) A covered person as defined under Subsection (10)(d)(i)(B) is entitled to the highest 
limits of underinsured motorist coverage afforded for any one vehicle that the covered person is 
the named insured or an insured family member. 
(iv) This coverage shall be in addition to the coverage on the vehicle the covered person is 
occupying. 
(v) Neither the primary nor the secondary coverage may be set off against the other. 
(e) A covered injured person is not barred against making subsequent elections if recovery is 
unavailable under previous elections. 
(11) A claim may not be brought by a covered person against a motor vehicle underinsured 
motorist policy more than three years after the date of the last liability policy payment. 
(12) (a) Within five business days after notification in a manner specified by the department 
that all liability insurers have tendered their liability policy limits, the underinsured carrier shall 
either: 
(i) waive any subrogation claim the underinsured carrier may have against the person liable 
for the injuries caused in the accident; or 
(ii) pay the insured an amount equal to the policy limits tendered by the liability carrier. 
(b) If neither option is exercised under Subsection (12)(a), the subrogation claim is deemed to 
be waived by the underinsured carrier. 
History: C. 1953, 31A-22-305, enacted by L. 1985, ch. 242, § 27; 1986, ch. 204, § 157; 1987, 
ch. 162, § 1; 1992, ch. 1, § 4; 1992, ch. 132, § 3; 1993, ch. 271, § 2; 1994, ch. 316, § 15; 1995, 
ch. 294, § 1; 1996, ch. 240, § 12; 1997, ch. 375, § 14; 1999, ch. 158, § 1; 2000, ch. 188, § 1; 
2001, ch. 59, §1 . 
Amendment Notes. - The 1997 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, substituted "Title 34A, Chapter 2" 
for "Title 35A, Chapter 3" in Subsection (4)(b)((ii). 
The 1999 amendment, effective March 18, 1999, added Subsection (2)(c), redesignating former 
Subsection (2)(c) as (2)(d), and made related and stylistic changes in the section. 
The 2000 amendment, effective May 1, 2000, added Subsections (3)(b) to (3)(e), (4)(a)(ii), (4)(c)(ii) to 
(4)(c)(iv), (9)(b) to (9)(d), (9)(f)(ii), (10)(c)f and (11), and made related changes; deleted "For new policies 
or contracts written after January 1, 1993" from the beginning of Subsection (9)(f)(i); rewrote Subsection 
(9)(g), revising the provisions for notice and disclosure; and made stylistic changes. 
The 2001 amendment, effective April 30, 2001, corrected a subsection reference in Subsection 
(10)(b)(ii) and added Subsection (12). 
Compiler's Notes. - The phrase "the effective date of this act" in Subsection (2)(c) presumably 
means March 18, 1999, the effective date of Laws 1999, ch. 158, which added that subsection. 
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R590. Insurance Administration. (Effective 1-10-02) 
R590-211. Underinsured Motorist Insurer Notification. 
R590-211-1. Authority. 
This rule is promulgated pursuant to the general rulemaking authority vested in the 
commissioner by Subsection 31 A-2-201(3). The authority to set minimum standards by 
rule for the manner in which notification shall be given between the claimant or a 
claimants representative and underinsured motorist insurers is provided in Subsection 
31A-22-305(12)(a). 
R590-211-2. Purpose. 
The purpose of this rule is to provide the manner in which a claimant, or a claimant's 
representative, shall give notification once liability policy limits have been tendered. 
R590-211-3. Scope. 
This rule applies to property and casualty insurers transacting business in Utah. 
R590-211-4. Rule. 
Notification by a claimant or a claimants representative shall include particulars for 
proper identification not limited to the following: 
(a) name and address of the insured; 
(b) policy number; 
(c) date of loss; 
(d) date of the payment; and 
(e) amount of the payment. 
Notification shall be sent or delivered to the underinsured carrier by certified mail, return 
receipt requested, or by facsimile, or by other electronic means which provides verification 
of delivery to addressee. 
R590-211-5. Severability. 
If any provision or clause of this rule or its application to any person or situation is held 
invalid, such invalidity shall not affect any other provision or application of this rule which 
can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the 
provisions of this rule are declared to be severable. 
R590-211-6. Enforcement Date. 
The commissioner will begin enforcing the provisions of this rule 45 days from the 
rule's effective date. 
KEY: insurance 
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